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1. Introduction
Introducing political economy features into the analysis of trade agreements
has not only enriched the economic literature on integration by imparting a
real world flavor, but it has introduced new hypotheses that have remained
outside the realm of the traditional treatment of the subject. An important
new hypothesis in the literature on trade integration, advanced by Grossman
and Helpman (1995, henceforth also cited as GH95), makes predictions about
industries that are prime candidates for exclusions from an otherwise free-trade
agreement (FTA). Without such industry exclusions, many successfully con-
cluded free trade agreements may not have even come into existence.1 The
exclusion of politically sensitive industries was a key feature of the Mercosur
pact, a trade agreement concluded in 1992 among the four South American
countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In this paper, cross
sectional data from its two leading countries, Argentina and Brazil, are used to
empirically examine the Grossman-Helpman hypothesis.
Though nascent, empirical evidence aﬃrming the validity of the new politi-
cal economy models of trade policy is accumulating (Goldberg and Maggi 1999,
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000, Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins 2000, Mc-
Calman 2000, and Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubasolglu 2000). This paper takes
perhaps the first step in the direction of theory-based empirical examination
of whether the political economy construct is valid in the trade agreement set-
ting. The increasing use of political economy as a central feature in the analysis
of trade integration (for example, Ethier 1998, Krishna 1998, and Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare 1999) warrants such an examination.2
The only other empirical study of political economy models of trade agree-
ments of which we are aware is Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998), also in the Merco-
sur context. We employ a diﬀerent specification than theirs, one that we believe
is tightly connected with the GH model and designed to produce more direct
inferences. A central feature of this paper is the analysis of nontariﬀ barriers
(NTBs) to internal trade even after the Mercosur agreement. These were main-
tained in addition to tariﬀs on intra-Mercosur imports, which are examined by
Olarreaga and Soloaga. Industries that maintained NTBs to internal trade are,
naturally, exclusions to the FTA. They were pervasive among the Mercosur pact
1For example, the NAFTA agreement excluded certain primary goods. The EEC chose
transfers over direct industry exclusions, notably the Common Agricultural Policy, but with
similar eﬀect. Almost all other agreements have featured long phase-in periods for tariﬀs,
if not outright exclusions, especially in politically powerful industries. Such phase-ins are
included in our definition of exclusions.
2Some examples of political economy models that produce conclusions diﬀerent from con-
ventionally held views are: (a) Richardson’s (1993) hypothesis that trade integration may
reduce trade diversion by hastening the decline of less eﬃcient sectors in the face of competi-
tion from the FTA partner, (b) Panagariya and Findlay’s (1996) political economy extension
of the traditional Meade model to examine trade diversion and creation, and (c) models by
Richardson (1994) and Panagariya and Findlay (1996) of the external tariﬀs in free-trade
blocs vis-a-vis the common external tariﬀs in customs-union blocs.
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countries, and, as we detail below, little progress has been achieved in eliminat-
ing them.
The paper takes a step that, we feel, sets it apart from first-generation stud-
ies of the political economy of trade policy. Those studies are best viewed as
using regression analysis to provide useful data summaries. Here, a tight link
between the theory’s prediction and its empirical implementation is developed.
It is hoped that this sets a standard for future empirical studies in this area.
The evidence presented in this paper is striking.
Section 2 begins with a background on the formation of Mercosur, and what
it has achieved by way of freeing trade. The GH95 model is analytically de-
scribed in Section 3 and its predictions motivated. In section 4 the Mercosur
data and the empirical methodology for examining the GH95 hypothesis are
detailed. Graphical data analysis and discussion of the formal econometric esti-
mates are the subject of Section 5. Finally, concluding observations are oﬀered
in Section 6.
2.The Political Economy of Mercosur
Mercosur as a regional integration scheme was notified to the GATT in
February of 1992. GATT/WTO normatives govern the relationships of the bloc
with third countries. The Treaty of Asuncion of 1992 laid the constitutional ba-
sis for the South Common Market (Mercosur) consisting of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay. The first article of the Treaty stated the ambitious
scope of the agreement as ”...the free circulation of goods, services and pro-
ductive factors among the member countries, through the elimination of the
tariﬀ and non tariﬀ restrictions to the circulation of merchandise.” Eventually,
by 2001, Mercosur was to become a customs union via the adoption of a com-
mon external tariﬀ and a common commercial policy vis-a-vis the non-Mercosur
countries.
The scope of the Treaty went beyond trade policy, into the coordination
of sectoral policies in agriculture and industry, harmonizing public taxes and
expenditures, coordination of monetary rules and exchange rates, liberalization
of capital markets, and the opening up of communications. It signified a water-
shed separating a brighter future from the economically and politically unstable
past. The free trade agreement was the centerpiece of this ”deeper integration”.3
The bodies charged with achieving the Treaty’s objectives were formed via
the Ouro Preto Protocol, signed in December 1994. They are the Council of the
Common Market, the Common Market Group, and the Mercosur Trade Com-
mission.4 The legislative bodies of the four countries ratified this structure,
3Neither is Mercosur the first attempt at a free trade agreement. The Treaty of Montevideo
created the ALADI agreement signed in 1980, preceded Mercosur, but was not nearly as
successful.
4The Council of the Common Market is in charge of politically facilitating the integration
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making Mercosur an institution of international law.
The Mercosur bodies are not supra national, so the decisions, resolutions and
directives put out by them have no legal force per se. For the common Mercosur
normatives to possess legal force they must be written into the national laws
and regulations of the Mercosur countries. The internalization of the common
rules has to be done via costly legislative approval, where lobbying has played
an important role in shaping the eventual policies in place. Political action by
industry lobbies and other pressure groups are in evidence in the slow internal-
ization of Mercosur norms and decisions. For example, 25% of the Common
Market Council decisions and 30% of the Common Market Group resolutions
failed to be internalized by at least one Mercosur country. On the trade front,
the directives of the Mercosur Trade Commission were being implemented with
even greater delay. 50% of the directives it had released by 1997 failed to be
internalized by at least one Mercosur country.
Exceptions to the Free Trade Agreement
Tariﬀs
The implementation of the Mercosur agreement in January 1995 implied the
complete elimination of import tariﬀs on trade among member countries. The
process of tariﬀ elimination was intended, through progressive linear and auto-
matic reductions, to reach a zero-tariﬀ state by the end of 1994. After an initial
drop in 1991 of 47% in the rates applied by each country to intra-Mercosur
imports, reductions took place every six months in order to achieve zero tariﬀs
at the beginning of 1995.
However, for a limited number of products, each country could maintain
transitory tariﬀs on imports from Mercosur partners. Argentina had 223 tariﬀ
line items on this list of exclusions from free trade, of which 57% were steel
products, 19% textiles, 11% paper and 6% footwear. Brazil had only 29 such
tariﬀ-line exclusions, including wool products, canned peaches, rubber products
and wines. Paraguay had 272 tariﬀ-line exclusions, with the majority in tex-
tiles, and others in agricultural products, wood and steel. Finally, Uruguay had
process and for taking decisions to assure the execution of the objectives set in the Mercosur
treaty. It is comprised of ministers of Foreign Relations and of Economy of the four member
countries. Its presidency is held for a duration of six months, and is rotated in alphabetical
order. The Common Market Group is the executive body of the Mercosur. It comprises
representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Relations, of Economy and of the Central Banks
of the four countries, and is assisted by a number of working sub-groups, specialized meetings
and ad hoc groups. The Mercosur Trade Commission (MTC) is an intergovernmental body
in charge of advising the Common Market Group on trade matters, to oversee the evolution
of common trade policies in the treaty. GATT/WTO normatives govern the relationships
of the bloc with third countries. Within Mercosur, the sources of law are (in decreasing
order of importance): Treaty of Asuncio´n, Protocol of Ouro Preto, decisions by Council of
the Common Market, resolutions of Common Market Group, and directives of the Mercosur
Trade Commission. These Mercosur bodies have been active. Since their inception, the
Council has issued 122 decisions, the Market Group has released 594 resolutions, and the
Trade Commission has written 95 directives.
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an extensive list of 1018 tariﬀ-line exclusions, including textiles (22%), chemical
products and pharmaceuticals (16%), and steel and electric machinery (8%). By
the end of 1994 the tariﬀ-line exclusions became part of an ”adaptation regime”
with the aim of lowering their tariﬀs until their complete elimination by 1999 in
the case of Argentina and Brazil, and by 2000 for Paraguay and Uruguay. Some
products included in the adaptation regime, such as steel, were also subject to
tariﬀ quotas. Trade in these products were relatively free of tariﬀs, but only up
to a quota, beyond which trade among the partners was tariﬀ-ridden.
Outright exclusions, in addition to the exceptions in the adaptation regime,
applied to the sugar and automotive sectors. They were not part of the trade
liberalization, because they were the most politically sensitive sectors within
each country. Brazil and Argentina had widely diverging policies with regard
to these industries. While an ad-hoc group for sugar and a technical commit-
tee for autos were created to plan the convergence in their national policies for
those industries, the exchange of these products continued to be subject to a
complicated set of rules and restrictions. Argentina maintained quotas and pro-
hibitions on sugar imports from its Mercosur partners. The Argentine position
was that this was necessary due to the generous subsidies enjoyed by Brazilian
producers from their government. For autos, a managed trade arrangement was
put in place, which favored local content, concessional entry of parts, and a
bilateral export balance requirement.
Non-Tariﬀ Barriers
The Treaty of Asuncion explicitly states that commercial liberalization should
embrace the elimination of non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs). As a first step towards
this politically diﬃcult objective, the Mercosur countries have established a
distinction among those NTBs that will be eliminated and those that will be
subject to a process of ”harmonization” and/or ”justification”. Harmonization
of a given national norm refers to the adoption by all member countries of a
unified version of a national norm that was previously in contradiction of the
Treaty of Asuncion. A harmonized regulation becomes a Mercosur normative.
Justification of a national norm refers to its acceptance by the remaining mem-
bers, whereupon the non-tariﬀ measure or norm continues to be maintained. If
it is neither possible to harmonize a national non-tariﬀ norm, nor justify it via
its acceptance by the other member states, the norm is to be eliminated.
The Mercosur Trade Commission, the body responsible for implementing the
NTB policy, has used the standards set by theWTO on the nature of permissible
common regulations, as they are documented in the various WTO agreements
on technical obstacles to trade. As of 1996, the results were mixed. Of a total
of 342 national norms that were identified, decisions on over half of these mea-
sures (180) were concluded. Of these concluded measures, 37 were eliminated,
76 were harmonized, 60 were justified, while 7 received ”regional treatment”,
that is they were applicable only on extra-Mercosur imports. Of the measures
that remain to be completed (162), 39 were to be eliminated (5 with regional
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treatment), and 102 were to be harmonized. The small number of regional
treatments implies that Mercosur’s dealings on non-tariﬀ restrictions has a dis-
tinctively nondiscriminatory character, as would befit a free-trade agreement.
The contentious issue of lowering NTBs lies ahead. It has been recognized
that internalization of NTB liberalization via changes in national laws and regu-
lations will, at best, take time to put into practice, and, at worst, undermine the
integration process in the face of mounting political action by interest groups
in favor of the status quo. It is possible that what had been achieved by 1996
was as close to the politically possible lower limit on NTBs that is likely to
be achievable. We take the position that without the existence of NTBs the
Mercosur agreement may not have been politically feasible. Retaining the right
to employ NTBs in a discretionary manner against imports from Brazil was
important to Argentinian interests, and has played out in the imposition of an-
tidumping duties on imports from Brazil on a number of occasions in products
such as textiles, apparel, autos, and footwear (Notisur, various issues in 1998;
Mercosur, 2000).5 NTBs are thus treated as significant exclusions to the FTA.
3. Theory: The Grossman-Helpman (1995) Model of
FTAs
It is apt to begin discussion of the theory with Viner’s (1950) analysis of
FTAs. Viner analyzed the second-best situation of a three-country one-good
case, where the highest price producer (least eﬃcient) of a good, country A, has
the opportunity to form a union with either the less ineﬃcient producer B, or
the most eﬃcient producer C. If A’s tariﬀ is prohibitive so that it produces the
good in the pre-FTA regime, the union will increase welfare by enabling imports
at a lower price. If A’s tariﬀ is nondiscriminatory but not prohibitive before the
union, so that it is importing from the least cost source C, then a free trade
union with B, where both A and B shut out C using a common external tariﬀ,
will be ”trade diverting”. A will now import from B at a higher than pre-union
price. But if both A and B were ineﬃciently producing the good before the
5Cases of the internal use of NTBs in excepted sectors are abundant. In steel products,
though the internal tariﬀ was eliminated, as scheduled, at the end of 1999, domestic producers
in Argentina filed an antidumping investigation against Brazilian importers (CNCE Annual
report 2000). The case ended with a private price agreement which, in practice, seriously lim-
ited Brazilian penetration into the Argentinean market. Other than antidumping, safeguards
and quantitative NTBs have been used to limit internal trade liberalization. As internal tariﬀs
disappeared on certain types of textiles, Argentinian producers filed a safeguard action against
all imports (including those of Brazil) in 1997 based on the GATT agreement for the liber-
alization of textiles and apparel products (Mercosur, 2000). Brazilian exporters successfully
complained to a Mercosur panel that the safeguard action was against Mercosur principles,
which prohibited safeguards within the region. A similar situation developed in 1998 when
Brazilian import-competing producers pressured their government for the establishment of a
non-automatic import license for certain food manufactures. Upon petition by Argentinian
exporters a Mercosur panel determined that the Brazilian government had to eliminate that
NTB (Mercosur 2000). The surge of various NTBs aﬀecting trade within Mercosur, as the
ones just mentioned, were sometimes also motivated by depressed macroeconomic conditions
in both economies as well as a Brazilian devaluation that threatened Argentinian producers
in the years following 1997.
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union, their union would be trade creating as the less ineﬃcient producer will
capture the union market. Since empirical analyses of the day (e.g. Lipsey,
1960) were finding in favor of customs unions primarily in Europe (for example
Benelux and ECM), Viner’s analysis emphasized the relative strengths of trade
creating and diverting forces while making normative judgements about trade
agreements.
While Viner’s analysis is ex post to the formation of a trade agreement,
Grossman and Helpman (1995) provide insight into how trade agreements may
come into existence, recognizing that the net gains from trade diversion and
trade creation will be the driving forces behind the decision by the two coun-
tries A and B to enter into an FTA.6
3.1 Domestic Politics
G =
nX
i=1
Ci() + aW (), (1)
where Ci is the political contribution made by industry i ’s lobby, which may
be zero if industry i is not politically organized or if its optimal contribution is
zero. In (1) W is aggregate gross-of-contributions welfare of all voters, given as
W() = l +
nX
i=1
π(pi) +N [r() + s()], (2)
where l is total labor income determined exogenously by the wage. In (2), π(pi)
is the aggregate reward to owners of specific factor i, or lobby i ’s ”profits”, as
a function of own producer price pi. N is the size of the voting population, r()
is the per capita amount of redistributed tariﬀ revenue, and s() is per capita
consumer surplus. In (1) the parameter a is the weight the government places
on W relative to contributions.7 Ci and W are functions of the domestic price
6Viner also made the positive observation that welfare losses were more likely when coun-
tries were complementary in the range of commodities protected by tariﬀs. Great overlap
between two union countries in the range of protected products would lead the more eﬃcient
of the two to capture the union market, reallocating resource eﬃciently. Less overlap would
result in the protected industry in one country capturing the union market, thus reallocating
resources ineﬃciently. Grossman and Helpman (1995) show that, where exclusions are not
permitted so that either all industries must be party to the FTA or none at all, the formation
of the FTA is actually more likely when there is less overlap, that is when trade diversion is
the driving force. Since our focus is on industry exclusions as the primary force behind an
FTA we do not examine this possibly interesting connection of GH95 with Viner’s analysis.
7If the government welfare function in (1) were rewritten with weights of a1 on aggregate
campaign contributions and a2 on aggregate welfare net of contributions (see Grossman and
Helpman, 1994, fn. 5), then a in (1) equals a2/(a1 + a2). Note that low values of a, say,
a < 2, substantially diﬀerentiate between the relative weight on aggregate welfare net of
contributions vis-a-vis aggregate contributions. If a > 4, then a2 > 0.8a1 and so high values
of a yield similar weights.
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vector () which may be diﬀerent from the free-trade price vector (∗).
The same industry structure and politically motivated welfare function is
used in Grossman and Helpman (1994) (henceforth GH94) to model equilibrium
tariﬀs resulting from domestic politics within a single country. We derive the
structure of protection equation from that model here, because the economet-
ric model used to investigate the GH95 model will exploit the close connection
between the two. The GH95 model may usefully be viewed as the second stage
of the FTA game where, in the first stage, the equilibrium nondiscriminatory
(pre-FTA) tariﬀs are determined independently in each country according to
the GH94 model.
The GH94 model is itself a two-stage game of lobbying and tariﬀ setting.
In the first stage each industry lobby presents a menu of contribution oﬀers to
their government, that is, the menu of ”prices” the lobby is willing to pay the
government for every possible n-vector of tariﬀs, where positive tariﬀs imply
protection to import-competing sectors, while negative tariﬀs imply subsidies
to exporters. They do this knowing that the government will choose the vector
of tariﬀs that maximizes its political welfare in (1). In the second stage the gov-
ernment, faced with these bids and the knowledge of welfare losses associated
with any set of tariﬀs, sets its welfare-maximizing tariﬀs according to (1), and
collects the bids associated with its choice.
Bernheim and Whinston (1984) characterize the equilibrium of the menu
auction as one that maximizes the joint welfare of the principals (lobbies) and
agent (government). In the GH94 context, this is equivalent to the choice by
lobbies of contribution schedules Coi (), i = 1, . . . , n, and the choice by the gov-
ernment of tariﬀs. Equivalently, the government chooses a tariﬀ-ridden price
vector (o) to maximize, individually with respect to every politically organized
lobby j, their joint welfare:
Vj +G = Wj(
o)−Coj (o) +
nX
i=1
Coi (
o) + aW (o)
= Wj(
o)−Coj (o) +
X
i∈L
Coi (
o) + aW (o). (3)
In (3) Vj =Wj(
o)−Coj (o) is the welfare of members of lobby i net of contri-
butions,8 and G =
P
i∈LC
o
i (
o) + aW (o) is the government’s welfare as in (1),
8Specifically, Wj() = lj + πj(pj) + αjN [r() + s()], where lj is labor income of members
of lobby j, πj(pj) is the aggregate rents or profits from their ownership of factor i, αj is the
proportion of the voting population comprising lobby j, N is population, and r() and s() is
as defined for (2). If αj is negligible, then lobby j’s welfare is well approximated by their
profits πj(pj). Note that the gross-of-contributions welfare component of the government’s
objective function isW =
P
j∈LWj+(1−αL)[l+N [r()+s()]], where L is the set of industries
with politically organized lobbies, (1− αL) is the proportion of the voting population that is
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rewritten to emphasize the role of the set of lobbies that are politically orga-
nized, denoted L. The maximization by lobbies and the government of the joint
surplus (3) is in addition to the maximization of the social welfare function in
(1) by the government.
Maximizing (3), given that the government maximizes (1), implies the first
order conditions (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, pp. 841):
X
i∈L
∂Wi
∂pj
+ a
∂W
∂pj
= 0, j = 1, . . . , n. (4)
The solution to these equations is the Grossman-Helpman structure-of-protection
equations:9
ti
1 + ti
=
Ii − αL
a+ αL
µ
zi
ei
¶
, i = 1, . . . , n. (5)
In (5) ti = (pi − p∗i )/p∗i is the ad valorem tariﬀ (positive) or export subsidy
(negative) for good i, where pi is the domestic price for good i and p
∗
i its world
price. In the first term on the right hand side of (5) Ii is an indicator variable
that equals one if sector i is organized into a lobby. The parameter αL is the
fraction of the population organized into lobbies (industries in the set L), and
a > 0 is as defined for (1). zi = yi/mi is the equilibrium ratio of domestic
output to imports (exports if mi is negative) and ei = m
0
ipi/mi is the elasticity
of import demand (positive) or export supply (negative). If industry i is an
import-competing producer and it is organized (Ii > 0) then it is able to ”buy”
protection (ti > 0) but obtains an import subsidy (ti < 0) if it is not organized
(Ii < 0). If industry i is an exporter and is organized, it is able to ”buy” an
export subsidy (ti > 0), but if it unorganized its exports are taxed.
A case worth considering is one where the number of members of lobby i is
negligibly small relative to the population, so that their share of the economy’s
consumer surplus and the rebated tariﬀ revenue is negligible. Only their own
producer price matters to the political calculus of lobby i, not their welfare loss
due to protection/subsidization of other industries. In that case, only i = j need
be considered in (4) to obtain the structure-of-protection equation (5). Then in
fn. 8, Wi is approximately given as Wi = πi(pi). From the results in fn. 9, now
unorganized, and l is total labor income. Hence, W is the sum of the welfare of individuals
who belong to lobbies and individuals who are unorganized.
9From the previous fn.,
P
i∈L ∂Wi/∂pj = (Ij − αL)yj + αL(pj − p∗j )m0j , where Ij is a
binary variable indicating whether industry j is politically organized, αL =
P
i∈L αi is the
proportion of the voting population that belongs to any lobby, yj is the output of industry j,
and mj is the import demand (export supply) function with m
0
j < 0 (> 0). The dependence
of yj and mj on pj is suppressed in the expressions for the partials. Also from the previous
fn., ∂W/∂pj = (pj − p∗j )m0j . Substituting these partials into (4) and solving yields (5).
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∂Wi/∂pi = Iiyi and ∂Wi/∂pi = (pi − p∗i )m0i. Substituting into (4) and solving
yields:
ti
1 + ti
=
Ii
a
µ
zi
ei
¶
, i = 1, . . . , n. (6)
Industry i is protected (or subsidized if it exports) only if it is organized, but not
otherwise. In order to focus on the key domestic elements and interactions be-
tween governments, Grossman and Helpman focus attention on this case, where
lobbies are negligible in size relative to the population. Then the structure of
pre-FTA nondiscriminatory tariﬀs (subsidies) is determined according to (6).
The empirical examination of the GH95 hypothesis about FTAs requires
identification of the politically most sensitive industries in terms of measurable
variables. The structure in (6) will provide the basis for this identification.
The politically most sensitive industries are defined as being those which bring
the greatest benefit to the specific factor owners and politicians taken together.
These are precisely those industries for which the change in the joint surplus
given by (3) is the greatest. We examine this connection in greater detail in
Section 4 after discussion of the GH95 model predictions.
3.2 Enhanced and Reduced Protection: The Losers and
Gainers
At the heart of the decision of whether to form an FTA are political pressures
for and against the FTA by the potential losers and gainers due to trade cre-
ation and trade diversion. GH95 use the term enhanced protection to describe
trade diversion and reduced protection to describe trade creation (relative to
the tariﬀ-ridden pre-FTA situation). In the GH95 general equilibrium model,
goods are produced independently of each other so that there are no cross-
eﬀects in production, and utility functions are additively separable so there are
no cross-eﬀects in consumption. So an industry may conveniently be analyzed
in a partial equilibrium setting. Figure 1, replicated from Grossman and Help-
man (1995, pp. 671), depicts the eﬀect of an FTA between countries A and B
on country A’s import-competing producers of good i, country B’s exporters of
good i, and consumers in both countries.
Suppose good i is defined in terms of units that make its world price equal
to 1. Let the pre-FTA nondiscriminatory tariﬀ-ridden prices in industry i in
countries A and B be, respectively, τAi and τ
B
i , with τ
A
i > τ
B
i . If after the
FTA the producer price increases, it raises profits of producers who become a
source of support for the FTA. If the consumer price decreases, it increases con-
sumer welfare, which is a motivating factor in a welfare-minded government’s
decision to enter an FTA. On the other hand, a reduction in producer price
lowers profits, and such producers will be a source of opposition to the FTA.
All these factors play out in the decision to form an FTA. There are three cases
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to consider, depicted in Figure 1.
Case 1 (Enhanced Protection): If output of industry i in B is small in
the sense that it is unable to fully satisfy A’s import demand so that its total
supply curve is XBi [TD] (TD for trade diversion) in Figure 1, then producers
in B experience enhanced protection as they divert their entire output to A’s
market, due to its higher price of τAi relative to its home price of τ
B
i . Domestic
demand in B is satisfied by imports from the rest of the world at the price
of τBi . Import-competing producers in A continue to enjoy the same level of
protection as before and do not oppose the FTA. Welfare loss relative to the
pre-FTA situation in A occurs because of the loss in tariﬀ revenue as imports
from the rest of the world, on which the tariﬀ can be imposed, are replaced by
imports from FTA partner B.10
Case 2 (Reduced Protection): If B’s output in industry i is large enough
that its total supply curve is XBi [TC] (TC for trade creation), then it is able to
more than satisfy A’s import demand at the lower of the two domestic prices.
Then B’s exporters satisfy A’s import demand at the price τBi , and produce the
rest for their domestic market. Since they receive no extra gain from the FTA
(they get no more than their pre-FTA price), exporters in industry i neither
support nor oppose the FTA. However, import-competing producers in A suﬀer
reduced protection and are likely to organize opposition to the FTA. Consumers
in A gain relative to the pre-FTA situation. In this case, import-competing pro-
ducers are likely to lobby for exclusions, if exclusions are permitted.11
Case 3 (Enhanced protection for A’s producers, Reduced protection for
B’s producers): If B’s supply curve for i is at XBi [TD, TC], then it is able
to satisfy A’s import demand at a price higher than its domestic price of τBi ,
but lower than A’s pre-FTA price of τAi . Then B’s exporters receive enhanced
protection and support the FTA, while A’s producers suﬀer reduced protection
10Note the following sources of gains in country B and losses in country A. The change
in profits to B’s exporters is ∆πBi = π
B
i (τ
A
i ) − πBi (τBi ) > 0, and the change in welfare is
∆WBi = ∆π
B
i + (τ
B
i − 1)XBi (τBi ), where (τBi − 1)XBi (τBi ) is the gain in tariﬀ revenue as its
entire domestic demand, previously produced at home (= XBi , at price τ
B
i ) is satisfied by
importing from the rest of the world. In country A there is no change in profits as producer
price in industry i remains unchanged. The only source of change in welfare is due to the loss
in tariﬀ revenue. Hence ∆WAi = −(τAi − 1)XAi (τAi ), where imports from the FTA partner is
the entire output of the partner, equal to XAi (τ
A
i ).
11Note the following sources of losses in country A and gains in country B. Import-
competing producers in country A experience a possibly large decline in profits, ∆πAi =
πAi (τ
B
i ) − πAi (τAi ) < 0. However, the increase in consumer surplus due to the price de-
cline softens the impact on welfare, ∆WAi = ∆π
A
i − (τAi − 1)MAi (τAi ) + sAi (τBi ) − sAi (τAi ),
where (τAi − 1)MAi (τAi ) is the loss in tariﬀ revenue since MAi (τAi ) was imported from the
rest of the world at the tariﬀ-ridden price before the FTA, and sAi (τ
B
i ) − sAi (τAi ) is the
increase in consumer surplus. In country B here is no change in profits as the producer
price remains unchanged. The only source of change is the gain in tariﬀ revenue. Hence,
∆WBi = (τ
B
i −1)MAi (τBi ), where exports ofMAi (τBi ) to A at price τBi are made up from the
rest of the world.
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and oppose the FTA. Consumers in A gain relative to the pre-FTA situation,
while consumers in B remain indiﬀerent. Some welfare loss in A occurs due to
loss in tariﬀ revenue. If exclusions are possible, the issue of which industries to
exclude pits the interests of A’s producers against those of B’s exporters.
3.3 Equilibrium Without Industry Exclusions
Suppose no exclusions (or side-payments between governments) are permitted,
so that either all the industries in both countries are to be included in the FTA,
or the status quo prevails and the FTA fails to materialize. Then an FTA occurs
only if both countries unilaterally favor the FTA. Consider the unilateral domes-
tic stance in a country. Lobby i presents the government with a contribution
schedule consisting of two bids, CiF and CiN , which are its promised contri-
butions in the event the government chooses the FTA (F ) or the status quo
(N), respectively. The unilateral stance is defined as a domestic equilibrium in
political contributions by each of the n lobbies, where (i) the contributions in-
duce the government to take a pro-FTA position, and (ii) the set of contribution
schedules is a Nash equilibrium, that is, given the contribution schedules of the
other lobbies and the anticipated optimization by the government, each lobby’s
contribution maximizes its own welfare. We consider only a pressured stance
where the position taken by the government is influenced by contributions.12
The first result (GH95, Result 2) is one about existence of a pressured stance
in favor of the FTA. If a pressured stance exists in favor of an FTA, then:
X
i
πiF + aWF ≥
X
i
πiN + aWN . (7)
That is, if the FTA-regime is supported in a country, it maximizes the joint wel-
fare of its lobbies [net of contributions, lobby i’s welfare is equal to
P
i(πi−Ci)
], and the government [whose welfare equals
P
i Ci + aW ). It is quite possible
that the inequality in (7) fails to hold in either of the two countries, making
the FTA impossible to achieve. This would happen in a country if, for exam-
ple, tariﬀs do not cause a substantial welfare loss and/or the government values
contributions more than welfare (so that the diﬀerence between aWN and aWF
is small), and the stakes from protection are high (so that
P
i πiN is high rela-
12In the unpressured stance, the government prefers the FTA regime rather than the status
quo, on the basis of public welfare (the aW component of its welfare function), without
recourse to any lobbying. A pressured stance occurs when, in order for the government to
prefer the FTA, positive contributions by supporters of the FTA (exporters) are needed in
order to outbid the sum of the maximum willingness to pay by lobbies that oppose the FTA
(importers subject to reduced protection). A pressured stance and an unpressured stance
may both exist. If they choose the same policy, then in equilibrium there is no lobbying.
The more interesting case is when they do not choose the same policy outcome. In that case
policy is chosen according to the pressured stance since it is coalition proof (GH95, pp 675).
Intuitively, while no single lobby may stand to lose as much as the (weighted) loss in public
welfare, a collection of lobbies may stand to lose more. They will collectively be able to sway
the government’s policy decision by contributing more than the loss in public welfare.
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tive to
P
i πiF ). Then import-competing interests may easily be able overcome
pro-FTA lobbying by potential exporters who would benefit from access to the
other country’s markets. Grossman and Helpman (1995) present the following
hypothesis about the viability of an FTA when no exclusions are possible:
Viability of an FTA without industry exclusions
An FTA among countries is most likely when trade between them is suﬃciently
”balanced”.
In their 2-country n good model, GH define balanced trade in terms of the
fraction of industries sx that are potential export industries in each country. A
more precise statement of Hypothesis 1 is that the political viability of an FTA
requires sx to be close to half. The intuition behind Hypothesis 1 is that with
unbalanced trade, some industries stand to lose a lot from the FTA and will be
able to successfully lobby their governments to change their unilateral stance
from one that favors the FTA to one that rejects it. With balanced trade, there
are a suﬃcient number of exporters who gain from trade diversion and hence
lobby for the agreement. Also, with balanced trade, welfare gains in many sec-
tors from reduced protection may oﬀset welfare losses in other sectors due to
trade diversion.
We examine this prediction graphically below. The intuition behind bal-
ancedness carries over to the understanding of how trade agreements may take
place even between countries that are not symmetric in their trade with each
other. The idea, which is investigated in the following section, is that by exclud-
ing some goods from the FTA, suﬃcient balancedness in trade in the remaining
goods may be brought about, making it possible to negotiate an FTA with ex-
clusions.
3.3 The Industry Exclusions Hypothesis
The GH model is insightful about why the successful conclusion of an FTA
is most often accompanied by a list of industries that are not part of the agree-
ment. Often, their exclusion is a precondition for the FTA, without which it
would not be possible to bring about the FTA. Consider the unilateral stance in
the GH95 model with industry exclusions. Lobby i now presents a contribution
schedule with three bids, CiN , CiE, and CiF , corresponding to the three possible
decisions by its government: stay with the status quo, proceed with the FTA
but with i excluded, proceed with the FTA with i included.
Suppose there is a constraint on the number of industries T that may be
excluded from the FTA. 13 Denote the set of politically optimal exclusions as
13The GH95 model accommodates other measure of exclusion that can be written asP
i Ti ≤ T . For example, Ti may denote the fraction of bilateral trade accounted by in-
dustry i, and T the maximum fraction of bilateral trade that can be excluded from the FTA.
The fraction of output, fraction of employment, or fraction of total trade are some other
measures on which exclusions may be based. We consider exclusions based on the number of
13
E(T ). If there were no constraint on the number of industries that may be ex-
cluded from the FTA, all industries for which the joint welfare of the industry
lobby and the government is higher in the status quo than under the FTA are
in the set E(T ). More formally, the change in the joint welfare of lobby i and
politicians, from including industry i in the FTA, is the sum of the change in
industry i’s profits net of contributions (denoted ∆πi = πiF − πiN) and the
change in government’s welfare (denoted ∆Wi = WiF −WiN).14 Denote this
change in joint welfare as gi = ∆πi + a∆Wi. Then the set E(T ) consists of all
industries for which gi < 0 if there is no constraint on the number of industries
excluded or if the constraint on the number of exclusions is not binding. If the
constraint is binding, then the T industries with the most negative values of gi
are listed for exclusions.
An important result is one about unilateral stances: A unilateral stance
exists if and only if
X
i∈E(T )
(πiN + aWiN) +
X
i/∈E(T )
(πiF + aWiF ) ≥
X
i
(πiN + aWiN) (8)
It is possible that where (7) fails (8) is satisfied. In words, where a unilateral
stance in favor of the FTA would have been impossible in the absence of such
exclusions, such a stance becomes possible when the most politically sensitive
industries may be excluded. (7) may be rewritten as
P
i(∆πi + a∆Wi) ≥ 0,
and (8) as
P
i/∈E(T )(∆πi + a∆Wi) ≥ 0 or, alternatively, as
P
i gi ≥ 0, andP
i/∈E(T ) gi ≥ 0, respectively. Since
P
i/∈E(T ) gi excludes industries with the
most negative gi’s, that is, lobbies with the greatest loss in their joint welfare
with government from being included in the FTA,
P
i/∈E(T ) gi ≥
P
i gi. That is,
it is easier to satisfy (8) than (7) by excluding those industries for which the
joint welfare gains are negative, presuming that such industries exist.
In the unilateral stance, the prime candidates for exclusion are import-
competing industries that are the most ”politically sensitive”, in the sense that
their inclusion imposes the greatest cost to the joint welfare of the specific factor
owners (lobbies) and politicians. Import-competing industries who experience
reduced protection (see Figure 1 and fn. 11 for the exact expressions for gi) im-
pose the biggest political costs. Industries with high stakes from being included
in the FTA, on the other hand, are potential exporters who enjoy enhanced
protection.
Suppose the unilateral stance with (a mutually agreed constraint on) exclu-
sions favor the FTA in both countries. The final decision that puts the FTA in
industries in order to keep the analysis and notation simple.
14Fns. 10 and 11 give exact expressions for ∆πi and ∆Wi under reduced and enhanced
protection, respectively.
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place is about which industries to exclude from the FTA. When the two gov-
ernments discuss the FTA, they bring their lists of potential exclusions to the
bargaining table. The industries that are excluded from the FTA are decided in
a bargaining equilibrium. GH95 consider the simple and intuitive Nash bargain-
ing solution to the bargaining game. Here, the two governments decide which
industries to exclude from the FTA in order to maximize a geometric weighted
average of the ”net gains”or ”surpluses”. Define an indicator variable αi, which
takes the value 1 if industry i is excluded from the FTA and the value 0 if it is
included in the FTA. Denoting the two countries as A (for Argentina) and B
(for Brazil), the bargaining solution solves for the exclusions as the solution to:
Max{αi} :::
X
j=A,B
h
GA(i)−GA
iηA h
GB(i)−GB
iηB
, ::::: s.t.
X
i
αi ≤ T. (9)
In (9), GA(i) =
P
i[αi(C
A
iE + aW
A
iN)+ (1−αi)(CAiF + aWAiF )] =
P
i∈E(T )(C
A
iE +
aWAiN) +
P
i/∈E(T )(C
A
iF + aW
A
iF ) is the welfare of government A if industries
i ∈ E(T ) are excluded. GA = Pi(CAiN + aWAiN) denotes the ”threat point” of
government A, that is, its welfare in the status quo.15 Similar definitions extend
to GB(i) and GB. ηA and ηB are the Nash weights denoting, respectively, the
bargaining strengths of governments A and B. The government with the higher
threat point will succeed in getting those industries excluded that its domestic
politics favor. The same holds for the government with the greater bargaining
strength. For example, if ηA = 1 and ηB = 0 then only government A’s list
of exclusions is considered in the bargaining game, subject, of course, to the
limitations on the number of exclusions. And if GB is small in comparison with
GA, then, all else equal, the bargaining equilibrium favors A’s list of exclusions.
This example is not as extreme as may appear, as we will see in the context of
Mercosur countries.
The diﬀerence between the threat points of the two countries reflect diﬀer-
ences in their underlying political economic structure, for example their profit
functions, the set of organized industries in the two countries, and the weights
their governments put on a dollar of contributions relative to a dollar of wel-
fare. The diﬀerence in their bargaining strengths are due to factors outside the
15In going from (8) to (9) the main diﬀerence is that the πi’s have been replaced by Ci’s.
This is because the coalition-proof stance in (8) can, by the results in Bernheim and Whinston
(1986), be supported by oﬀers in which (i) lobbies bidding for exclusions bid the same amount
as they would for a rejection of the FTA, i.e. CiE = CiN , (ii) industries that are not in the
excluded, that is j /∈ E, bid for an exclusion (CiE) exactly what they would lose by being
included in the FTA (this is zero for exporters, but may be positive for an import-competing
industry which is not excluded due to the constraint on the number of exclusions), and (iii)
any industry that is excluded, i.e. i ∈ E , never bids more than what it stands to lose by being
included in the FTA, but probably bids less, for it needs to bid just enough to ensure that
the joint welfare gain from its exclusion (−gi) exceeds the joint welfare gain from excluding
the marginally included industry (i.e. the largest −gj). Substituting these contributions into
the government’s political welfare function (1), we get the expressions for GA(i) and GB(i).
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model.16 The first order conditions for solving (9) lead to the following testable
implications about industry exclusions.17
Industry Exclusions
Exclusions are granted to industries for which a weighted sum of the politi-
cal benefits of market access to the exporting country and the political cost of
greater import competition in the importing country, is most negative. (The
weights are functions of the Nash weights and aggregate surpluses of the two
countries.)
Consider arranging industries in ascending order according to the weighted
sum
ωA × [(CAiF + aWAiF )− (CAiE + aWAiN)] + ωB × [(CBiF + aWBiF )− (CBiE + aWBiN)]
or
ωA × [(∆CAi + a∆WAi )] + ωB × [(∆CBi + a∆WBi )] (10)
where ωJ = ηJ/(GJ(i) −GJ) weights country J ’s gains from including indus-
try i in the FTA. Then industries with a value of ωA × [(∆CAi + a∆WAi )] +
ωB × [(∆CBi + a∆WBi )] lower than a cutoﬀ are excluded from the FTA. The
cutoﬀ (see fn. 17) is equal the negative of the Lagrange multiplier of the con-
straint on number of exclusions. Hypothesis 2 states that industries for whom
the weighted sum of political benefits of market access to the exporting country
and the political cost of greater import competition in the importing country is
most negative, are excluded from the FTA.
4. Empirical Implementation and Data
4.1 Empirical Implementation
In order to empirically examine the validity of the GH95 hypothesis about
industry exclusions, industries must be ranked according to (10). This requires
measurement of the change in the joint welfare of each industry lobby and its
government due to the inclusion of the industry in the FTA, for both countries.
In order to find measurable variables that are as close to the theory as possible,
and which facilitate the ranking of industries according to (10), we draw on
16In the case of Mercosur the FTA was part of a ”deeper integration” and harmonization
of policies other than trade policy. Argentina was the stronger bargainer on issues other than
trade because it led the way on aspects of the deeper integration pertaining to fiscal, monetary,
and stabilization policies. If Argentina’s bargaining strength extended to trade issues, then it
is reflected in a higher ηA than ηB .
17The objective function in (9) may be written in logs, after substituting for the G’s, as:
ηAlog[αi(CAiE + aW
A
iN ) + (1− αi)(CAiF + aWAiF )− (CAiN + aWAiN )+
ηB log[αi(CBiE + aW
B
iN ) + (1− αi)(CBiF + aWBiF )− (CBiN + aWBiN )
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results from Grossman and Helpman (1994) that were described in Section 3.1.
This is done in two steps. First, the nature of the gains and losses from the
FTAs is revisited in greater detail. Second, the connection between these gains
and losses to measurable variables is made clear.
Consider each term in the weighted sum in (10). Since the theory con-
cerns one-way trade (Krishna 1998, develops the analysis of the formation of
FTAs with imperfectly competitive markets), we can analyze each industry in-
dependently. Let us consider industry i and revisit Figure 1. Whenever trade
diversion in any industry produces gains for exporters in B (i.e. producer price
in industry i is greater than τBi in Figure 1), it also produce a nonnegative
gain in tariﬀ revenue for their governments without any additional welfare loss
compared with the pre-FTA situation. Industries in B that would be poten-
tial exporters to their FTA partner will therefore be at the bottom of the list
of exclusions in B’s unilateral stance. On the other hand, trade diversion is
accompanied by a loss in tariﬀ revenue to government A, since what the FTA-
partner now supplies, free of the tariﬀ, was earlier imported at the world price
plus the nondiscriminatory tariﬀ. While this is the only source of opposition
to the FTA when there is pure trade diversion (that is, when producer price
remains at τAi ), a possibly powerful source of opposition occurs if producers in
A experience a decline in their producer price, or when there is reduced pro-
tection. In any industry, the opposition from import-competing producers to
the FTA increases with the size of the price decline due to trade creation, and
is most fierce when there is pure trade creation under the FTA (that is, when
producer price declines to τBi ). Once again, consider the three cases in Figure 1.
The first case is that of pure trade diversion which occurs when the producer
price in industry i remains at τAi . Then the only opposition B’s exporters face
is due to the loss in tariﬀ revenue experienced by the government of A. If the
loss in tariﬀ revenue is not large (no side-payments between governments are
permitted), then the industry is also likely to be low on the list of exclusions in
the unilateral stance of country A. Since B’s government wants industry i to be
included in the FTA, and neither the industry’s lobby in A nor A’s government
opposes its inclusion, this industry will be included in the FTA. However, if the
loss in revenue is large, the outcome will hinge on the bargaining power of the
two countries. This, in turn, depends on their Nash weights (the larger the ηJ
the greater is J ’s bargaining power) as well as the diﬀerence between their wel-
fare in the Nash equilibrium and at their threat points (the lower is GJ(i)−GJ
the greater is J ’s bargaining power).
In order to empirically assess which industries are likely to be included in the
FTA, suppose that the two countries are symmetric in their aggregate bargain-
ing power. Then their domestic politics determines which industries are to be
included. In Section 3.1 we showed that the GH94 model led to the prediction
that the problem of joint welfare maximization of each industry lobby and the
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government led to the simple and intuitive structure of protection equation in
(6):
ti
1 + ti
=
Ii
a
µ
zi
ei
¶
, i = 1, . . . , n. (11)
In the context of politically organized export interests, (11) implies that in the
export-subsidy game of GH94, politically organized industries (I = 1) with a
high output-to-export ratio (z) and low absolute export supply elasticity (ei) get
the largest export subsidies. This is due to three reasons. First, the marginal
cost of ”buying” export subsidies for such an industry is lower than in indus-
tries with higher export elasticities, since a unit of the subsidy imposes greater
deadweight costs as ei increases. Hence it has to compensate the government
less than industries with higher export elasticities for the same amount of the
subsidy, all else equal. Second, since the size of profits is determined by the size
of output, the higher is output the greater the stakes from protection. Third,
the lower are exports, the lower is the loss in consumer surplus.
At the margin, for each politically organized industry, the lobbying contri-
butions are just enough to compensate for the loss in government’s welfare as
in (4). However, the total contribution to the joint welfare of an industry and
the government is highest for industries that succeed in securing the highest
export subsidies. Hence, industries that lobby hardest for an export subsidy
are precisely the ones lobbying for inclusion of the industry in the FTA. The
political calculus behind lobbying for access to a market with a higher producer
price is similar to the political calculus behind lobbying for an export subsidy.
The subsidy has the same ultimate eﬀect as an FTA: an increase in the producer
price.
In order to evaluate which industries actively support inclusion into the FTA,
(11) can be applied as follows. Define the index IJXi× (z/e)JXi, where IJXi takes
the value 1 if industry i in country J is politically organized as an export indus-
try, and 0 if it is not so organized, and (z/e)JXi is industry i’s output-to-export
ratio divided by its absolute export supply elasticity. In computing this index
the output-to-export ratio requires the use of potential exports to the FTA part-
ner country (whereas in (6) it is defined using total exports). The reason can
be most clearly seen in the case of an industry which competes with imports
from rest of the world in the pre-FTA regime, but becomes an exporter in the
FTA-regime, being the lower cost FTA-producer.
The index IJXi × (z/e)JXi varies positively with the change in joint welfare
of industry i in country J and its government from being included in the FTA.
Consider applying this index to the bargaining game in the pure trade diversion
case. If the tariﬀ loss experienced by, say, B’s government is small, then indus-
tries in A experiencing gains from trade diversion should unambiguously be
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included in the FTA. If the tariﬀ loss experienced by B’s government is large,
then the outcome depends on its bargaining power, and whether the weighted
sum in (10) is lower than the cutoﬀ.
The second case is one of pure trade creation or reduced protection which
occurs when the price to import-competing producers of good i in country A is
lowered to country B’s domestic price τBi in Figure 1. These producers are op-
posed to being part of the FTA, due to the possibly large decline in their profits
(∆πAi = π
A
i (τ
B
i ) − πAi (τAi ) < 0). The government of country A experiences a
change in welfare that is, both, lowered due to the decline in industry profits and
the decline in tariﬀ revenue, and raised due to the increase in consumer welfare
following the price decline [∆WAi = ∆π
A
i −(τAi −1)MAi (τAi )+sAi (τBi )−sAi (τAi ),
see fn. 11]. In the unilateral stance of country A, therefore, industries that
experience pure reduced protection are the source of the biggest losses in the
joint welfare of the industries and government. For industry i this loss is given
by ∆πAi +a∆W
A
i . Any industry for which ∆π
A
i +a∆W
A
i < 0 is a candidate for
exclusion, for excluding it raises the industry’s profits (and therefore its contri-
butions) as well as produces tariﬀ revenue, which more than makes up for the
decrease in consumer surplus. The more negative is ∆πAi + a∆W
A
i , the higher
is industry i on the list of potential exclusions.
The unilateral stance of country B regarding industries which experience re-
duced protection in A depends on its tariﬀ revenue gain as part of its domestic
supply which is diverted to satisfy demand in A must be imported from abroad
(since producer and consumer prices stay the same in B, there is no other source
of support for the FTA among producers and consumers in B). If the gain in
tariﬀ revenue is small, B’s government is indiﬀerent to the exclusion of these
industries from the FTA. Then, in the bargaining equilibrium it is likely that
A’s unilateral stance regarding exclusions will dominate decisions on which in-
dustries to exclude from the FTA, subject to the constraint on their number.
In order to empirically evaluate which industries impose the biggest losses
on the joint welfare of the industry and government when there is pure trade
diversion, we apply equation (11) to this case. Industries that lobby hardest
for import protection are the same industries who would also lobby for exclu-
sion of the industry from an FTA. The political calculus behind lobbying by an
industry to prevent foreign access to their market at a lower producer price is
similar to the political calculus behind lobbying for a tariﬀ (which holds up its
producer price). In (11) the industries that are highly protected are politically
organized industries (Ii = 1) with a high output-to-import ratio (zi) and low
absolute import demand elasticity (ei) for the same reasons as in the previous
case of the export subsidy: (i) a price distortion in an industry with low elastic-
ity inflicts a lower deadweight loss than one in an industry with a high import
elasticity, and (ii) the higher the output-to-import ratio, the greater the stakes
from protection and lower the welfare loss inflicted on consumers. Define the
index IJMi × (z/e)JMi, where IJMi takes the value 1 if industry i in country J
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is politically organized as an import-competing industry, and 0 otherwise, and
(z/e)JMi is industry i’s output-to-import ratio divided by its absolute import
supply elasticity. The definition of z is now based on imports from the FTA
partner country, (while in (6) it is defined using total imports). The index
IJMi × (z/e)JMi , varies positively with change in joint welfare of industry i in
country J and its government from being excluded from the FTA.
Consider applying this index to the bargaining game in the pure trade creation
case. If import-competing producers in A experience reduced protection, and
the tariﬀ gain experienced by the government of B is small, then industries in
country A experiencing losses should be candidates for exclusion from the FTA.
Similarly, if import-competing producers in B experience reduced protection,
and tariﬀ gains to A’s government are small, then these industries in B will
be candidates for exclusion from the FTA. Which industries will actually be
excluded in the bargaining equilibrium depends on the constraint on exclusions,
and the relative bargaining strengths of the two countries.
The third case is the intermediate case where both enhanced and reduced
protection occur. In Figure 1, this occurs in industry i when the producer price
seThen import-competing producers of good i in country A experience a de-
cline in profits (∆πAi < 0). ttles at a level below τ
A
i but above τ
B
i . Though
the decline is smaller than in the pure enhanced protection case, it may still be
substantial, leading producers in A to organize opposition to being part of the
FTA. In country B, potential exporters gain from trade diversion as their pro-
ducer price rises above τBi . The interests of government B are aligned with the
interests of lobby i, since tariﬀ revenue is gained without any loss in consumer
welfare from including industry i in the FTA. But A’s government may or may
not be aligned with its producer interests due to the gain in consumer welfare
as price declines. In industries which experience both trade diversion and trade
creation, the unilateral stances of each country come into conflict on the issue
of which industries to exclude from the FTA. The solution to the bargaining
game achieves an equlibrium between export interests in B who desire inclusion
and import-competing producers in A who desire exclusion.
As before, we apply equation (11) to measure which industries are the ben-
eficiaries from enhanced protection and which industries lose from reduced pro-
tection in each country. The index IJXi × (z/e)JXi measures the joint gain to
exporters in industry i in country J and J ’s government due to the inclusion
of i in the FTA. The higher is this index, the greater is the gain. The index
IJMi× (z/e)JMi measures the joint gain to import-competing producers in indus-
try i and its government, by excluding i from the FTA. It is possible to have a
high value of IJXi×(z/e)JXi in one country, and a high value for IJMi×(z/e)JMi in
the other, in the intermediate case of enhanced as well as reduced protection..
The bargaining strengths of the two countries play a critical role in deciding
which, if any, of these industries to exclude from the FTA.
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To summarize the discussion in this section, consider the hypothetical setting
where both countries are symmetric. They are mirror images of each other, so
that exactly half of their industries export to their FTA partner, and the other
half import from the FTA partner. To begin with, suppose there is no con-
straint on the number of industries that may be excluded. Then all industries
that experience pure trade diversion in the two countries are excluded from the
agreement, under the assumption that the loss of tariﬀ revenue in the partner
country is not big enough that considerations of bargaining strength begin to
matter. They impose the biggest loss on the joint industry-government welfare
in each country from being included in the FTA. The next biggest loss is im-
posed by industries that experience both enhanced and reduced protection, but
where there is more reduced than enhanced protection. In the symmetric case,
this occurs when the FTA price in any industry settles close to the low-tariﬀ
country’s price (τB in the case of Figure 1). Then there is great opposition to
the FTA by importer-competing producers, without a counter-balancing eﬀort
by export interests in the other country. These industries, where the losses from
reduced protection in one country outweigh the gains from enhanced protection
in the other, are also excluded from the FTA. At the margin are those indus-
tries where the losses from reduced protection in one country exactly balance
the gains from enhanced protection in the other. The remaining industries are
included in the agreement. If there is a constraint on the number of industry
exclusions then it is possible that some politically sensitive industries, those
experiencing pure reduced protection, may not be excluded.
Having motivated the connection between measurable variables and the-
oretical gains and losses from exclusion/inclusion in the FTA, we are ready
to propose an econometric specification for investigating the theory. Define
the four indices (I × z/e)JMi, J = A,B and and (I × z/e)JXi, J = A,B as:
(I × z/e)JMi = IJMi × (z/e)JMi, and (I × z/e)JXi = IJXi × (z/e)JXi, where IJMi
equals 1 if industry i in country J is a politically organized import-competing
producer, (z/e)JMi is the output-to-imports (from the FTA partner) ratio di-
vided by the absolute import elasticity of industry i in country J , IJXi equals
1 if industry i in country J is a politically organized exporter and 0 otherwise,
and (z/e)JXi is the output-to-exports (to the FTA partner) ratio divided by
the absolute export elasticity of industry i in country J . We use the following
econometric model to examine the GH95 exclusions hypothesis:
yi = β0 + β1 (I × z/e)AMi + β2 (I × z/e)AXi + β3 (I × z/e)BMi + β4 (I × z/e)BXi + ²i,
(12)
where yi is an indicator variable measuring whether industry i is excluded
(yi = 1) or included (yi = 0) in the FTA. We measure two types of indus-
try exclusions. The first measures the incidence of internal tariﬀs, which is also
used by Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998). The second measures the incidence of
nontariﬀ barriers (NTBs).
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In the symmetric situation discussed above, Hypothesis 2 predicts that im-
port variables will have non-negative coeﬃcients: β1 ≥ 0, β3 ≥ 0 while the
export variables will have non-positive coeﬃcients: β2 ≤ 0, β4 ≤ 0. When there
is asymmetry between the two countries in their bargaining strengths or threat
points, the coeﬃcients in (12) may reveal the nature of such asymmetries. For
example, if exclusions and inclusions are determined by A but not B, then we
should see β1 > 0, β2 > 0, and β3 = 0, β4 = 0.
With asymmetries either in trade patterns or bargaining strength, the theory
is quite consistent with other permutations on the signs of the coeﬃcients. We
view this as a useful feature of the theory because, given its validity, the the-
ory explains what a specific permutation of coeﬃcient signs implies about trade
politics. For example, suppose the coeﬃcients are inferred to have the following
permutation of signs: β1 > 0, β2 < 0, β3 < 0, β4 > 0. Then, according to the
theory, country A’s organized import-competing industries entirely determined
the exclusions and its organized exporting industries entirely determined the
inclusions. Not only were country B’s organized interests ineﬀectual in deter-
mining exclusions, but the industries they most wanted to exclude were included
(β3 < 0) and the industries they most wanted to include were excluded (β4 > 0).
The theory traces the reason for this to the fact that most industries probably
fell into the intermediate case of both enhanced and reduced protection, where
import-competing interest groups in A were pitted against exporting interests
in B, and A’s export interests were pitted against import-competing interests
in B. The estimates reveal that A’s import-competing interests and exporting
interests won in the bargaining game, at the expense of their competitors in B.
This example demonstrates the value of the GH95 model as a theoretical device
for empirically summarizing and understanding the factors determining the for-
mation of FTAs. We will use (12), both, in order to infer about the validity
of the GH95 model, and to understand the relative bargaining strengths of the
two largest Mercosur partners.
4.2 Data
Mercosur is typical of regional trade agreements among countries that are
geographically close, share a common history vis-a-vis the rest of the world, and
are at relatively similar stages of development. This is not to say that there are
few diﬀerences among them. Mercosur partner countries are quite disparate in
market size and composition of output. Brazil, the largest country, accounted
for 60
The data for the empirical analysis are organized at the 6-digit Harmonized
System (HS) level of disaggregation of almost 4500 goods produced by man-
ufacturing industries. That level of detail was chosen over a more aggregate
system of classification such as the 80-industry ISIC (rev. 2) 4-digit level for
two reasons. First, actual decisions about tariﬀ rates are made a the HS level.
The incidences of tariﬀs and NTBs vary widely at this level of detail, which
is masked by a higher level of aggregation. Second, in order to make full use
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of the information in internal tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) which were
available to us at the HS level, it is econometrically desirable to estimate the
model with such micro-level data. Since the theory requires no more than bi-
nary measures of the data, the HS level is the appropriate level of analysis. The
internal tariﬀs of Argentina and Brazil are for the year 1996, and were kindly
provided by Marcelo Olarreaga. The NTB data are also for the year 1996, and
was provided to us by the Argentinian International Trade Commission (CNCE,
2000). The appendix provides more detail on development of the NTB data.
The binary exclusions variables are measured by taking the union of bi-
nary exclusions for the two countries. Table 1 indicates that in 3.5% of the
sample of HS 6-digit lines Argentina imposed tariﬀs to internal Mercosur trade
(IATARIFF=.035), while Brazil imposed internal tariﬀs on only 0.3% (I
B
TARIFF =
.003). The measure of tariﬀ exclusions used in the probit analysis is the union
of these tariﬀ exclusions. Since they are in separate tariﬀ lines, their union is
approximately their sum (ITARIFF = .037).
NTB exclusions are similarly constructed for three types of NTBs: Pro-
hibitions which prohibit imports but allow imports via a government agency,
Import Authorizations which require the prior authorization of the government
before any import transaction may take place, and Core NTBs which include
Prohibitions (but not Authorizations), as well Import Licensing and Quotas. As
described in the Appendix, the Mercosur countries did not consider the more
conventionally used antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVDs) and
safeguard actions as non tariﬀ barriers. Data for AD/CVD actions are incom-
plete and uneven across the two partners, since they were not required to report
them to the Mercosur Common Market Group, the body responsible for keeping
trade and protection data. Our analysis thus restricts attention to Prohibitions,
Authorizations and Core NTBs.18 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the
incidence of these NTBs by Argentina and Brazil, and also the union of the two.
Since there is an overlap in the HS lines on which NTBs in the two countries
were imposed, the means for the union of the measures in the two countries
(IPROH, IAUTH, and ICORE) are less than the sum of corresponding Argentina
and Brazil means. The reason for the overlap is that in a number of industries
the nondiscriminatory NTBs, used to protect from rest of the world imports,
have been maintained in the Mercosur regime as well. That is, the two coun-
tries have kept their options open as to the internal use of NTBs. The summary
statistics in Table 1 show that progress on the elimination of NTBs has certainly
18AD and CVDs are in use in Mercosur countries, but since they were not recognized as
such, the Mercosur NTB database we obtained does not include details on those NTBs for
both Argentina and Brazil equally. An independently compiled summary in the WTO semi-
annual reports on AD and CVDs indicated, as we would suspect, that Argentina applied far
more of these actions against Brazil than did Brazil against Argentina. The WTO report
shows that 25% of the 90 Argentinian AD actions (34% in import terms) in force, as of 1998,
were directed against Brazil (the largest recipient of AD actions, followed by China). Brazil, in
turn, imposed no AD or CVD actions on imports from Argentina, though it had 82 AD/CVD
actions in force as of 1998. 30% of these were directed against China and the U.S.
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not kept pace with tariﬀ elimination.
The construction of regressors in (12) required data on output, trade, and
elasticities for Argentina and Brazil at a consistent level of classification. The
ISIC (rev. 2) 4-digit level was the most detailed level at which value added
data and other data required to estimate import elasticities were available.
The output-to-imports (ziM) and output-to-exports (ziX) variables are there-
fore computed at the ISIC level. Bilateral imports and exports are used for
the purpose of computing ziM and ziX . Import elasticities are estimated for
each 4-digit ISIC industry, as described below. The imports, exports and out-
put data are averaged over the four years 1993-1996, before constructing the
output-to-imports and output-to-exports ratios. This reduces concerns about
their endogeneity, since the tariﬀ and NTB data are for the year 1996. The
regressors so computed are then mapped into the HS 6-digit level using a stan-
dard conversion system.
Import elasticities are estimated using quarterly data for Argentina between
1992-99. Due to a change in the data-keeping system in 1992, there is great
discord between pre- and post-1992 data. We chose to use post-1992 data to
estimate elasticities. For each of the ISIC industries the import elasticities were
estimated using the following model, motivated by Senhadji (1998):
Mt = a0 + a1Pt + a2Dt + a3Mt−1 + et, t = 1992 : 1, . . . ,1999 : 4,
where M=ln(imports from the world), P=ln(price of imports), D=ln(value
added-exports to the world), and e is a classical error term. Since the lagged
dependent variable is included, the assumption on the error term yields consis-
tent estimates. The import elasticities are measured as the estimated values of
a1.19
Table A.1 lists the elasticity estimates and other features of the model used
to estimate them. The elasticities were estimated with the correct signs for a
majority of the 4-digit industries. In the case where the estimated values were
nonpositive, they were set equal to their closest 4-digit neighbor. The same
elasticities are used for Brazil, because quarterly price and quantity data were
unavailable for Brazil. Importantly, the elasticities are ”generated” variables
and must be corrected for an error-in-variables problem before being used to
construct regressors in (12). To do this we use the method of Gawande (1997),
which is described in some detail in the appendix.
19The models are estimated by assessing the presence of stationarity and cointegration in
the data. For each industry, the Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity is performed on each of
the three series (M, P, and D). The results show that these series contain unit root (i.e.,
integrated of order 1, I(1)). Since the estimates of elasticities are meaningful only if the I(1)
variables are cointegrated, a test of cointegration is also performed on these series. The null
of noncointegration is rejected for most series.
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To our knowledge, there are no estimates of export supply elasticities re-
ported in the substantial literature on trade elasticity measurement. We pro-
ceeded by presuming that export elasticities are equal to unity (or some con-
stant) in all industries.20 Hence, the explanatory variables in (12) employ the
estimated elasticities in the definition of (z/e)AMi and (z/e)
B
Mi, but elasticities
are presumed equal to unity in (z/e)AXi and (z/e)
B
Xi.
A key consideration in investigating the Grossman-Helpman model is the
proper measurement of lobbying organization, that is, the indicator variables
IAM , I
B
M , I
A
X , and I
B
X . If cross-sectional data on lobbying in Argentina and Brazil
were available, it would be possible to measure them either by the method in
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) or by simply using a cutoﬀ rule as in Gold-
berg and Maggi (1998). Unfortunately, lobbying data for the Mercosur countries
are not available to us. The primary reason is that while lobbying activity is
pervasive, there are no legal reporting requirements for such expenditures as
there are in the U.S. Indirect measures, for example, the number of industry
professionals that belong to politically well-connected organizations may also
be used to measure political organization. But our search for measures of such
networks did not yield systematic data. Further, we are specifically interested in
lobbying organizations set up for the purpose of influencing trade policy and not
some other policy. Those data are diﬃcult to obtain for even highly developed
countries.
We chose to construct simple measures of export and import lobbying organi-
zation in Argentina and Brazil using cutoﬀs based on available data on trade and
output-per-firm. The first set of formal results we present presumes that indus-
tries in the ISIC 4-digit sample in which total imports (from the world) exceed
the sample mean are politically organized into protectionist lobbies. Applying
this definition to industries in Argentina and Brazil, respectively, provides mea-
sures of IAM and I
B
M . A similar cutoﬀ above the sample mean for total exports
is used to define IAX and I
B
X , that is, indicators for politically organized lobbies
seeking to promote their exports. The descriptive statistics for the number of
organized industries in both countries, and the regressors in (12) constructed
using this mean threshold are given in Table 1.
Given the simplicity of our construct, it is imperative to demonstrate ro-
bustness of our results to diﬀerent measures of political organization. For this
purpose, results from four other measures of the set of vectors { IAM , IBM , IAX ,
IBX }, using a variety of diﬀerent cutoﬀs, are presented. Their performance is
20Olarrreaga, Soloaga, and Winters (1999) argue for the use of import shares in the partner
country as a proxy for export supply elasticity of the exporting country. For example, if
the importer has an infinitely small share of the exports, then it has no ability to influence
price, and thus faces an infinitely elastic export supply curve. But if the importer has a
large market share and is a price-maker, then the export supply curve it faces is inelastic.
The results from using partner’s imports share data as proxies for export elasticities yielded
results that are, for the most part, qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. There
are some quantitative diﬀerencs, though.
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compared with the baseline model via large-sample non-nested tests.
5. Political Economy of Trade Agreements: Evidence
5.1 Graphical Analysis
Had there been no industry exceptions, would trade between Argentina and
Brazil under Mercosur be ”balanced” enough that the agreement would have
been possible without exceptions? A negative answer to this question seems
requisite for any analysis of the exceptions hypothesis to be meaningful. Oth-
erwise, why should exceptions even be discussed among potential FTA partners?
Hypothesis 1 clarified that without suﬃcient ”balancedness” in trade be-
tween two countries, the viability of a free trade agreement without industry
exclusions is seriously in doubt. Balancedness in trade in a cross-section of
manufacturing industry requires that there should be a suﬃcient number of in-
dustries in both countries that stand to gain from trade diversion. Balancedness
creates the best opportunity for exporting interests to overcome opposition to
the FTA from import-competing producers and thus establish unilateral stances
in favor of the FTA in both countries. Also, with balanced trade, welfare gains
in many sectors from reduced protection may oﬀset welfare losses in other sec-
tors due to trade diversion.
If there were no industry exclusions, the gains from the Mercosur trade agree-
ment would have been lopsidedly in favor of the larger country Brazil. This is
evident in Figure 2, which depicts the distribution of total production in 1996
between the two partner countries across eighty 4-digit ISIC (rev 2) industries.
The bars are sorted in ascending order of Argentina’s share. Since the 1996
data are ex post to the Mercosur agreement (with industry exceptions), they
are approximations to the hypothetical distribution that would have prevailed
in the absence of exceptions. Nevertheless, it is the best approximation available
in order to provide a satisfactory answer to the question posed at the begin-
ning of this section. If trade between the two countries were balanced in the
Grossman-Helpman sense, then the industry with equal output shares between
the two countries (0.50, or the mid-point of the horizontal axis in Figure 2)
would approximately be the median industry in the sample (the mid-point of
the vertical axis). This is clearly not true in the figure, for the industry with
equal shares (labeled DRUG) is the 13th industry from the top in Figure 2,
which puts it at the 85th percentile in the set of 4-digit ISIC industries. If the
cutoﬀ for balancedness were relaxed to a 0.45 share, then the threshold industry
(MFGTXT) is ranked 60th or is at the third quartile in the set of 4-digit ISIC
industries.
In theory, if the larger of the two industries were the exporting industry and
the smaller of the two the import-competing producer, then the distribution of
output in Figure 2 implies that under (fully) free trade, Argentina would import
in approximately 75% (and perhaps more) of the 4-digit ISIC industries, and
export in only 25% (or less) of them. While this distribution may have induced
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a unilateral stance in favor of an FTA without exceptions in Brazil, a similar
stance in Argentina would probably have been defeated by politically organized
import-competing producers.
The intuition behind industry exclusions is transparent in Figure 2. For the
moment, suppose that a third of all the 4-digit ISIC industries, all from among
industries ranked below MFGTXT (rank=60), were excluded from the FTA.
Then MFGTXT would be the median industry among the included industries.
This would provide the best opportunity for unilateral stances in favor of the
FTA on both sides. Of course, many other permutations of industry exclusions
may be found, featuring exclusions for import-competing producers in Argentina
and Brazil, that support unilateral stances on both sides. But in all of these
permutations, the distribution of output in Figure 2 implies that, according
to the Grossman-Helpman theory of exclusions, Argentina would require many
more exceptions than Brazil in order to make the FTA viable. Or, given the
successful conclusion of the FTA, we should find that Argentina was accorded
the lion’s share of exceptions.
Figures 3, 4.1, and 4.2 reveal the previous prediction to be approximately
true. Figure 3 indicates which industries were excluded from the zero tariﬀ
requirement of the Mercosur agreement. While the exceptions and the subse-
quent tariﬀs imposed on their bilateral imports by Brazil and Argentina were
decided at the HS tariﬀ line level of detail, Figure 3 depicts the import-weighted
average tariﬀs at the 4-digit ISIC level. While Argentina was permitted tariﬀ
exclusions in fifteen of the 4-digit industries, Brazil obtained tariﬀ exclusions
in only three. Argentina also obtained ”hard” exclusions on autos and sugar,
without which Argentinian production in these sectors would have contracted
following the FTA. Most of the Argentinian tariﬀ exceptions occurred in indus-
tries that appear in the bottom two-thirds of Figure 2. They are marked with
the label ”AT” (for Argentina Tariﬀ exceptions).
NTBs are potentially more restrictive instruments than tariﬀs. For a num-
ber of NTBs it is diﬃcult to accurately quantify or stringently define their use.
As a result, there are no precisely written codes of conduct regarding their
use, as there are for tariﬀs in the WTO rules. Considerable discretion may
therefore be exercised in just how restrictively they are used. Figures 4.1 and
4.2 depict, respectively for Argentina and Brazil, the distribution across the
eighty 4-digit ISIC industries of NTBs in 1996. At the ISIC level of aggregation
they are measured as the proportion of the bilateral imports covered by NTBs.
Coverages of three types of NTBs are displayed: Prohibitions, Import Autho-
rizations, and Core NTBs. A comparison of Figure 4.1 with Figure 4.2 confirms
the prediction that NTBs are far more frequently imposed by Argentina than
by Brazil. Figure A.1 in the appendix aﬃrms that as a percentage of total
manufacturing imports, Argentina’s NTB coverage of imports from Brazil is far
greater than Brazilian NTB coverage of imports from Argentina. A comparison
of NTB coverages on imports from the Mercosur partner with NTB coverages
27
on imports from the world in Figure A.1 shows that their multilateral character.
We hypothesize that if it were easier to negotiate NTB exclusions, then they
would follow the pattern predicted: many exclusions in the bottom two-thirds
of the industries in Figure 2 in order to gain the support of import-competing
producers in Argentina, and a handful at the top of the distribution to satisfy
import-competing producers in Brazil. Even with the present NTBs, this pat-
tern is in evidence. In Figure 2 the labels ”AN” and BN” indicate industries
subject to Prohibitions in Argentina and Brazil, respectively. A majority of
the industries protected in Argentina via Prohibitions are in the bottom two-
thirds of the distribution where Brazil is the potential supplier in the FTA,
and those protected in Brazil via Prohibitions are in the top of the distribu-
tion where Argentina is the potential supplier in the FTA. To be sure, there
are counter-intuitive incidences of NTBs: Argentina protected some industries
at the top of the distribution in which it had a larger share of joint output
(e.g. 80. Containers, 77. Engines, and 75. Industrial Machinery), while Brazil
protected industries in which it had a greater share of joint output (e.g. 19.
Industrial Chemicals, 34. Canned Vegetables, and 36. Other Chemicals). But
these instances are probably due to the fact that the NTB data do not dis-
tinguish between protecting against rest of the world imports and protecting
against FTA partner imports.
5.2 Probit Analysis
Data Graphs
As a prelude to the formal econometric analysis, Figures 5.1-5.4 provide a
summary of the 6-digit HS data indicating how tariﬀ and NTB exclusions may
vary with the regressors (I × z/e)AM , (I × z/e)AX , (I × z/e)BM , and (I × z/e)BX .
Recall that the regressors were constructed at the 4-digit ISIC level of eighty in-
dustries, and then concorded into the 6-digit HS level comprising 4490 tariﬀ line
items, in order to make full use of the exclusions data available at the tariﬀ line
level. The concordance replicates the 4-digit data at the 6-digit HS level. The
bars in Figures 5.1 depict frequency distributions, representing the occurrence
of tariﬀ and NTB exclusions for sets of values of the regressor (I × z/e)AM . For
example, the left-most bar in Figure 5.1 shows that, of the 6-digit HS lines for
which (I × z/e)AM is around zero (whenever IAMi equals 0 so does (I × z/e)AM),
tariﬀ exclusions had a low rate of incidence. However, over 30% of these lines
had incidences of Core NTBs. The number at the top of the bar indicates that
of the sample of 4490 6-digit HS observations, 1589 had a value of zero for
(I × z/e)AM . The bars are for intervals of values of (I × z/e)AM which round
oﬀ to the indicated number. The left-most bar thus accommodates values of
(I × z/e)AM in the interval [0, .005), and the bar to its right is for the interval
[.005, .015).
If the bivariate data for tariﬀ exclusions and (I×z/e)AM were in accord with
the theory unconditionally with respect to the influence of other issue and con-
trol variables, then we would expect to see a pattern with high frequency of
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tariﬀ exclusions associated with greater values of (I×z/e)AM , and low frequency
of tariﬀ exclusions associated with smaller values of (I × z/e)AM . The data on
tariﬀ exclusions is bi-modal; a high frequency of tariﬀ exclusions occurs when
(I×z/e)AM is around 0.02, and also when it is around 0.19. For NTB exclusions,
the pattern is not clear unconditionally. It seems that Authorizations do not
vary as predicted vis-a-vis (I × z/e)AM : they have a low frequency of occurrence
at high values of the regressor, but occur with high frequency at low values of
the regressor. Prohibitions do not appear to unconditionally support the theory,
but since they occur with high frequencies at high values of (I×z/e)AM , but with
appropriate control variables their incidence could be driven by (I × z/e)AM in
the manner predicted by the GH95 theory. The probit analysis below is directed
at precisely questions of this kind.
Figure 5.2 indicates, sharply enough, that Prohibitions data may be in accord
with its prediction vis-a-vis (I × z/e)AX : the rate of occurrence of Prohibitions
diminishes as (I × z/e)AX increases. That is, organized exporters in Argentina
with high stakes from access to Brazil’s market are able to include their indus-
tries in the FTA.
How the exclusions data vary with the Brazil regressors (I × z/e)BM and
(I × z/e)BX are depicted in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. There do not appear to be un-
conditional associations of the regressors with the exclusions data, though there
may be strong associations conditional on the inclusion of other regressors, par-
ticularly for NTBs. High values of (I×z/e)BM do have high incidences of NTBs,
and low values of (I × z/e)BM do have high incidences of NTBs. But while these
associations are in line with the theory, they are accompanied by incidences of
NTBs not entirely consistent with the theory, at least as they appear uncondi-
tionally in the Figures. The probit analysis is designed to shed light on this issue.
Probit Model Estimates
The probit model (12) is now used to formally examine the GH95 exclusions
hypothesis. Marginal eﬀects (i.e. slopes) from probit models of tariﬀ and NTB
exclusions are reported in Table 2. t-statistics are reported in parentheses be-
low the marginal eﬀects. In addition to the four regressors in (12), all models
include a constant and eight 1-digit HS dummies. The inclusion of the dummies
is strongly favored by any information criteria that penalizes additional regres-
sors (such as the Akaike of Schwartz information criteria). The t-values appear
in parentheses below the estimates, and asterisks indicate precisely estimated
coeﬃcients. Shaded cells indicate where estimates may be at odds with the
theory, as explained in the discussion of the results below.
Consider first the estimates in the four columns of Table 2 labeled ”All Org.”.
They are from models which assume that all industries are organized in both
countries, that is, IAMi = I
A
Xi = I
B
Mi = I
B
Xi = 1 for all i. In the face of mounting
evidence in favor of the GH94 model cited earlier, this is clearly a doubtful
assumption. In part, estimates from this doubtful model are reported to show
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just how poorly this model performs in the context of trade integration relative
to models which measure the extent of political organization. The estimates in
Table 2 show that while a case for this model may be weakly made for tariﬀ
exclusions, the same models for NTB exclusions show little, if anything, of sig-
nificance for Prohibitions and Core NTBs, and have contrary signs on all four
coeﬃcients with Authorizations data.
In columns labeled ”I1” are presented estimates from models that presume
that some but not all industries are politically organized. Specifically, in the
models estimated in Table 2, the political organization indicators are con-
structed according to the ”sample mean” criterion, as described above in Section
4.2. For example IAMi = 1 if total imports from the world of (4-digit ISIC) in-
dustry i in Argentina exceeds the (4-digit ISIC) sample mean of total imports.
The variables IAXi, I
B
Mi, I
B
Xi are similarly constructed using the mean threshold
for total exports and imports in the relevant countries. Formal non-nested tests
(not reported here), following the method of Davidson and MacKinnon (1993)
specifically designed for probit models, strongly rejected the models labeled ”All
Org.” in favor of their counterparts labeled ”I1”, in all four cases. An inspection
of the simple log-odds ratios also indicates that the ”I2” models are far more
likely than their ”All Org.” counterparts.
Inferences from the ”I1” models, specifically from the NTB exclusions data,
are striking. But first, consider tariﬀ exclusions. The estimates from the ”I1”
models of tariﬀ exclusions indicate that politically organized Argentinian im-
porters were successful in obtaining tariﬀ exclusions. The estimated coeﬃcient
on (I × z/e)AM indicates that the greater their stakes from preventing free trade
with Brazil in their industry, the higher the probability that organized import-
competing industries were able to be excluded from the FTA. For an increase
of one standard deviation, or 0.10 (see Table 1), in (I × z/e)AM , the probability
of exclusion increased by 0.56%. Although precisely measured, it is not an eco-
nomically large probability response, considering the significant magnitude of
change in the regressor. The likely reason for why the marginal eﬀect is small
is because only 3.7% of the sample of the 6-digit HS sample were allowed tariﬀ
exclusions (see Table 1), and tariﬀ exclusions incidences are approximately bi-
modally distributed at, both, high and low values of (I × z/e)AM (Figure 5.1).
The net result is a statistically significant, but economically weak, aﬃrmation
of the GH95 hypothesis for tariﬀ exclusions.
The negative coeﬃcient on (I × z/e)AX indicates that organized Argentinian
exporters were unable to lower the probability of excluding industries in which
they may have gained from enhanced protection in the Brazilian market. Again,
the probability response is not of an economically significant magnitude. Not
surprisingly, neither Brazil’s importer-competing interests nor exporters exerted
any significant influence on the probability of tariﬀ exclusions. It should be
noted that even though their coeﬃcients are economically small, the combina-
tion of a positive coeﬃcient on (I×z/e)AX (i.e. β2 > 0) and a negative coeﬃcient
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on (I × z/e)BX (i.e. β3 < 0) is at odds with the theory. Suppose that industries
determining these coeﬃcients fall into the intermediate case (the third case dis-
cussed in Section 4.1) with both enhanced and reduced protection. Then β2 > 0
implies that organized Argentinian exporters (and their government) failed to
include the industries they most wanted to, because Brazilian import-competing
interests (and their government) prevented their inclusion. But β3 > 0 implies
that Brazilian import-competing interests not only failed to prevent their inclu-
sion, but also the inclusion of industries that hurt them (and their government)
the most.
Models with NTB exclusions provide (i) strong, and credible inferences about
the validity of the Grossman-Helpman hypotheses, and (ii) a realistic and sensi-
ble description of the politics that lay behind the formation of Mercosur. Con-
sider the estimates from the model labeled ”I1” with Prohibitions data. The
positive estimates on β1 indicate that Argentinian import-competing lobbies
were successful in (increasing the probability of) maintaining Prohibitions on
those goods whose inclusion into the FTA would have hurt them and their gov-
ernment the most. Further, as the positive estimate on β4 reveals, this came
at the expense of export lobbies in Brazil who desired the inclusion of those
goods in the agreement. In the bargaining game over exclusions by Prohibi-
tions, Argentinian import-competing producers were the winners over Brazilian
exporters. The estimate on β1 is precisely measured, but more importantly,
it is economically significant in magnitude. According to its estimate, a one
standard deviation increase in (I × z/e)AM , or 0.10, increased the probability of
exclusions by Prohibitions by 10.91%.
The bargaining strength of Argentinian export interests is revealed by the
statistically and economically significant estimate on β2. The marginal eﬀect
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in (I×z/e)AX , or 0.10 (see Table
1), increased the probability of including an industry in the FTA, that is, ex-
empted it from Prohibitions in Brazil, by 34.12%. This did not necessarily come
at the expense of Brazilian import-competing producers, who were successful in
(increasing the probability of) obtaining exclusions from the FTA by maintain-
ing Prohibitions on internal trade in industries they most desired to exclude.
This is indicated by statistically precise estimate on β3. According to the esti-
mate, a one standard deviation increase in (I × z/e)BM , or 0.31, increased the
probability of exclusions via Prohibitions by 4.65%. These exclusions may have
taken place in industries where Brazilian import-competing producers would
experience pure reduced protection. Such exclusions would then encounter no
resistance from Argentinian export interests.
Towards the bottom of Table 2 are reported estimates for ”Importer Strength”
and ”Exporter Strength”, measured by Wald statistics for β1−β3 and β2−β4,
respectively. If β1 − β3 > 0 then the data fail to reject the hypothesis that
Argentinian import-competing industries had greater bargaining strength in ob-
taining exclusions relative to their Brazilian counterparts. If β2 − β4 < 0 then
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the data fail to reject the hypothesis that Argentinian exporting industries had
greater say in which industries to include in the FTA, relative to their Brazilian
counterparts. As we would expect from the descriptive analysis of the data, the
Wald statistics show that Argentinian export and import-competing interests
dominated decision-making over which industries to exempt from Prohibitions
and which industries were allowed to protect themselves using Prohibitions.
The probability of exclusions to the FTA via the use of Import Authoriza-
tions was largely determined by Brazilian import-competing interests, while
Argentinian export interests were also eﬀective in limiting the (probability of)
use of Authorizations. The estimate of 0.274 for β3 from the ”I1” model of Au-
thorizations indicate that for every standard deviation increase in (I × z/e)BM
(by 0.31), the probability of Authorizations increased 8.50%. The estimates for
β2 indicate that for every 0.10 increase in (I × z/e)AX , the probability of Au-
thorizations decreased by 2.43%. While not economically large, it does indicate
that pressure exerted by export interests in Argentina was to some extent able
to keep the use of Authorizations by Brazil in check. It appears that at the top
of Brazil’s list of exclusions from Authorization were industries experiencing
pure reduced protection, and at the top of Argentina’s list of inclusions, were
industries experiencing pure trade diversion. This is probably why Brazilian
import-competing interests and Argentinian export interests succeeded to some
extent in getting their wishes. Brazilian exporters were, however, unable to
check the (probability of the) use of Authorizations by Argentina, as evinced
by the precisely measured positive coeﬃcient on β4. While the statistically in-
significant estimate on β1 shows that Argentinian import-competing interests
were unsuccessful in (increasing the probability of) exempting the industries
they most wanted to exempt from Authorizations by Brazil, they were at least
able to prevent Brazilian export-interests from removing Authorizations on in-
dustries in which they desired free trade with Argentina.
Core NTBs have a similar pattern of estimates on the four issue coeﬃcients
as Prohibitions, which is to be expected from the data graphs, since Core NTBs
were largely composed of Prohibitions.
Sensitivity Analysis
The estimates presented above were based on a specific method of measur-
ing political organization in the two countries: industries with world imports
(exports) that exceeded the sample mean of world imports (exports) were con-
sidered organized as import-competing (exporting) producers. The measure-
ment of political organization is crucial to the proper empirical implementation
of the Grossman-Helpman framework. Given the absence of any unanimous
criterion to measure political organization in the trade arena due to limita-
tions on available data, we undertake to examine the sensitivity of the results
in Table 1 under three diﬀerent measures on political organization. Estimates
from those models, labeled ”I2”, ”I3”, and ”I4”, are presented in Table 3. In
these models we still use cutoﬀs based on sample statistics from the ISIC 4-digit
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sample to define political organization. In the models labeled ”I2”, industries
in which total imports from the world averaged over 1993-96 exceed the 85th
percentile in the sample are considered politically organized import-competing
industries, and a similar cutoﬀ defines organized exporting industries. Applying
this to manufacturing industries in Argentina and Brazil provides measures of
IAMi, I
A
Xi, I
B
Mi, I
B
Xi. In the models labeled ”I3”, a 90th percentile cutoﬀ is used
to similarly define political organization. In the models labeled ”I4”, a combi-
nation of a mean cutoﬀ on imports and exports (as in Model ”I1”) and a 25th
percentile cutoﬀ on output per firm (as a proxy for concentration) is used to
define political organization. This last definition is motivated by the finding in
previous studies (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000; Gawande, 1997b) that
firm concentration is an important determinant of lobbying organization in the
U.S.
In order to summarize the results in Table 3 in a compact and systematic
manner, non-nested model comparisons have been performed using the test de-
veloped specifically for probit models by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). The
Davidson-MacKinnon (DM) statistics are reported in the last row of Table 3. A
statistically significant value for the DM statistic implies rejection of model I1
reported in Table 2 relative to its counterpart in Table 3, while a statistically
insignificant value cannot reject the model I1. For example, the DM statistics
for tariﬀ exclusions data do not indicate a preference by the data for the models
in Table 3 over Model I1. Nevertheless, it may be noted that the inferences
from tariﬀ exclusions data are qualitatively similar to those from Model I1 in
Table 2 (with the possible exception of model I4).
The DM statistics for incidences of Prohibitions similarly indicate that the
data on Prohibitions do not necessarily prefer the models in Table 3 over Model
I1. Nevertheless, the inference that is robust across all four models is about the
strong influence of Argentinian export-competing interests. In industries experi-
encing both, enhanced and reduced protection, this implied that they were able
to limit the number of exclusions on Prohibitions permitted Brazilian import-
competing producers. In industries experiencing pure enhanced protection, this
implied that Argentinian export interests were able to profit from trade diver-
sion.
The models for Import Authorizations in Table 3 are all preferred over Model
I1 in Table 2 according to the DM statistic. The models here imply that both
Argentinian and Brazilian import-competing interests were able to influence the
number of exclusions to the FTA in terms of the ability to impose this NTB
on internal trade. A one standard deviation change in (I × z/e)AM led to an in-
crease in the probability of exclusions desired by Argentina’s import-competing
producers by between 3.5% and 6.2% across the three models, while a similar
change in (I × z/e)BM led to an increase in the probability of exclusions de-
sired by Brazil’s import-competing producers by between 2.3% and 8.1% . But
for an absolute unit change in the two regressors, Argentinian importers were
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able to obtain exclusions with a higher probability. This is indicated by the
Wald statistics for ”Importer Strength” for the Authorization models. Since
this finding about the bargaining strength of Argentinian import-competing in-
terests is in contrast to Table 2, we use the models in Table 3, on the basis of
the DM statistic, to make inferences from data on the incidence of Authoriza-
tions. The estimates on β1 together with β4 from these models indicate that
import-competing interests were not only able to obtain a higher probability of
exclusions on goods that may have experienced reduced protection, but were
also able to lower the probability of allowing export interests in Brazil to bene-
fit from access to their markets (in industries falling in the intermediate case of
enhanced and reduced protection).
The results about Core NTBs from the models in Table 3 yield somewhat
diﬀerent inferences from the results about Core NTBs from Model I1 in Table 2.
Since the DM statistics exhibit a preference by the data for the models in Table
3, we use them to make inferences. The robust result is about the strength of
Argentinian export interests in influencing the probability of which industries
would be able to engage in trade free of Core NTBs after the FTA.
Three other types of sensitivity analyses were also conducted. The first was
sensitivity to heteroskedasticity, where heteroskedasticity was modeled as a lin-
ear function of a set of four two-digit ISIC-level dummies. The results for all
models I1-I4 presented here are quite insensitive to the heteroskedasticity spec-
ification. Notably, the heteroskedastic specification was preferred on the basis
of likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics to the specifications reported in Tables 2
and 3.
The second sensitivity analysis was motivated by the question of whether
the results from the full sample of 4490 lines would hold up if only observations
with positive trade (over 1993-96) between the two countries were considered.
Eliminating lines in which there was no trade between Argentina and Brazil
dropped the sample to 2422 lines, yet the results remained surprisingly robust
to their exclusions.
Mercosur was due to become a customs union by the year 2001. To this end
the member countries had agreed to a preliminary vector of common external
tariﬀs (CETs) by 1995 in order to facilitate convergence to the CET. The third
sensitivity analysis checks whether any early convergence of the external tariﬀs
of the two countries to the common external tariﬀ aﬀects the results. Since the
GH95 model is one about FTAs, not customs unions, we formed a ”true FTA”
sample by excluding those lines in which the external tariﬀ of either Argentina
or Brazil was equal to the CET. This dropped the sample to 3659 observations.
The results from this sub-sample are qualitatively close to the estimates pre-
sented in Tables 2 and 3.
In sum, the results are seen to be quite robust to a variety of sensitivity anal-
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yses, which, in this context, appear to be important in order to make sturdy
inferences.
6. Conclusion
The results of this paper may be viewed in two ways. The first is that they
allow credible inferences to be made about an important economic model of
the politics behind free trade agreements put forth by Grossman and Helpman
(1995). Their exclusions hypothesis makes clear predictions about which in-
dustries are most likely to be excluded from a free-trade agreement (FTA) in
order for the FTA to come into existence. The tight connection of the empirical
specification to the theory enables us to make inferences about the validity of
the Grossman-Helpman exclusions hypothesis. The results in the paper yield
striking new evidence in favor of the GH95 model. While the aﬃrmation of
the model is weak with tariﬀ exclusions data, it is strong with NTB data. The
results with NTB data are robust to a variety of perturbations in model spec-
ifications, to diﬀerent measurement of regressors, and to the estimates using
sub-samples motivated by issues specific to the Mercosur agreement.
A graphical analysis, based on Grossman and Helpman’s proposition about
what it might take to successfully conclude an FTA without exclusions, suggests
that due to the asymmetries in their size and consequently in their potential
bilateral trade patterns after an FTA, an FTA without exclusions would not
have been possible between Argentina and Brazil. Further, in order to reach
an agreement, Argentina’s export interests or import-competing interests, or
both, would be decisive on the issue of which industries to include and which
to exclude from the FTA. This would be especially true in industries with both
enhanced and reduced protection, where interests in Argentina and Brazil were
pitted against each other. It was possible for Brazil’s import-competing lobbies
to also obtain exclusions, but only in those industries in which it met no re-
sistance from Argentinian export lobbies. This restricted Brazilian exclusions
to industries in which it’s producers could potentially experience pure reduced
protection in the FTA .
This intuition is confirmed by the more formal econometric analysis of tariﬀ
and NTB exclusions. Argentina’s import-competing interests largely determined
the probability of exclusions from zero internal tariﬀs, and exclusions from zero
internal Import Authorizations, which could be used to protect them in the
FTA regime. Argentina’s export interests largely determined the probability of
limiting which Brazilian industries could be exempted from zero internal Pro-
hibitions and Core NTBs (mostly composed of Prohibitions). In the bargaining
over exclusions, gains by Argentina’s import-competing interests came at the
expense of Brazil’s export interests. Brazil’s import-competing interests were
also eﬀective in increasing the probability of exclusions from zero internal Im-
port Authorizations to protect them in the FTA regime. These gains seem to
have come in industries featuring pure reduced protection in the FTA regime,
thus meeting no opposition from Argentine export interests.
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The theory makes it abundantly clear that unless the two partners are sym-
metric, we should not expect quantitatively symmetric eﬀects. The results
should show that the country in which import-competing interests felt greatly
threatened by the FTA, would win the exclusions game, precisely because exclu-
sions would be designed to achieve symmetry in the goods that are freely traded
in the FTA regime. Hence, the evidence that Brazil’s organized importers were
only weakly successful in obtaining NTB exclusions to the free trade agree-
ment, while Brazil’s organized exporters were not eﬀective in gaining access to
Argentina’s markets in goods with the greatest potential to profit through en-
hanced protection, accords well with the GH95 theory.
The second view of the Grossman-Helpman model is that it provides a so-
phisticated and powerful lens through which to examine the politics behind an
FTA. Given the validity of the theory, empirical work based on the theoretical
framework should provide answers to these three questions: (i) Which country
was most crucial to the successful negotiation of the Mercosur trade agreement?
(ii) In which country did import-competing producers or exporters have greater
influence over the characteristics of the eventual agreement? (iii) Are the les-
son learned applicable to other nascent agreements? The answers our analysis
providesa are (i) Argentina. (ii) Both, import-competing producers and ex-
porters in Argentina in industries with both enhanced and reduced protection;
import-competing producers in Brazil but only in industries with pure reduced
protection, that is, no gains of access for Argentinian exporters. (iii) Certainly,
especially for FTAs among unequal partners which may be impossible to achieve
without exclusions.
So far, we have made no normative judgements about whether FTAs are
desirable relative to the status quo. That is an issue under considerable debate,
since an FTA among a set of countries likely worsens the rest of the world’s
welfare. Within a political economy construct, Richardson (1993) demonstrates
an endogenous mechanism by which external tariﬀs decline over time in the
FTA regime, so that they are welfare improving in the long run. If so, then the
validity of the GH95 model of the politics behind FTAs should motivate its use
as a blueprint for how to achieve FTAs.
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Appendix
I. DATA
1. NTBs: The 1996 NTB database at the 8-digit HS level was obtained
from the Mercosur Secretariat, and constructed by Technical Sub Group No.
8 (of the Common Market Group of Mercosur, see fn. 4) from information
provided by the individual Mercosur countries. The NTBs are classified in a
manner that is quite diﬀerent from the the UNCTAD system, so we use the
classifications used in the SG No. 8 database. The main NTBs, comprising
what we call Core NTBs are Prohibitions (goods cannot be imported by pri-
vate sector firm, but via a government agency), Import Authorizations (prior
authorization is required before any import transaction), Import Licenses (a li-
cense must be purchased from the government permitting a specified quantity of
imports), and Import Quotas. The more conventional (according to frequency
of international use) NTBs such as antidumping duties, countervailing duties,
and safeguards were not considered to be NTBs by the Mercosur countries, and
hence not recorded in the SG No. 8 database. In the case of the Mercosur coun-
tries, it appears that the most widely used NTBs are Prohibitions and Import
Authorizations. Figure A.1 indicates that in 1996 they covered, respectively,
7% and 2% of Brazil’s total manufacturing imports from Argentina, and 32%
and 40% of Argentina’s manufacturing imports from Brazil. The analysis in
the paper is restricted to those two NTB-types plus a more encompassing type
called Core NTBs (which, in addition to Prohibitions and Authorizations, also
includes Licenses and Quotas). The NTB data used in the probit analysis are
0/1 indicators of the three types of NTBs. The 0/1 indicators are constructed
by taking the union of the exclusions in the two countries. Thus if for a 6-digit
HS line item, either Argentina or Brazil (or both) imposed a Core NTB on in-
ternal trade, then the Core NTB exclusion variable takes the value 1. Otherwise
it takes the value 0.
2. Tariﬀs: Tariﬀ data are the 6-digit HS data used by Olarreaga and
Soloaga (1998) to construct their more aggregate ISIC level tariﬀ data for their
analysis.
3. Other Variables: The variables zM =output/imports, zX ==output/exports,
and import elasticities e are measured at the 4-digit ISIC (rev. 2) level of ag-
gregation. The export, import, and output data are from the Argentina and
Brazil censuses, and are averaged over the four years 1993-96 before computing
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the variables zM and zX . In order to construct the z/e ratios consistently, the
z variables and the elasticity measures must be available at the same level of
aggregations. The 4-digit ISIC level is the most detailed level at which they
are available. The z/e ratios were concorded into the 6-digit HS level using a
standard concordance available from UNCTAD. Indicators for politically orga-
nized import (IM) and export lobbies (IX) are constructed at the 4-digit ISIC
level from data on world imports and exports, together with output-per-firm (as
proxies for concentration ratios). No directly measures of lobbying are available
either for Argentina or Brazil. A variety of criteria were used to construct many
sets of IM and IX vectors for Argentina and Brazil. Results based on those sets
are used to demonstrate the robustness of the econometric results.
II. Estimation of import elasticities and their errors-in-variables correc-
tion: Table A.1 presents import elasticity estimates using quarterly Argentine
data over 1992-99. The method is from Senhadji (1997), and entails the esti-
mation of the model (without industry subscripts):
Mt = a0 + a1Pt + a2Dt + a3Mt−1 + et, t = 1992 : 1, . . . ,1999 : 4, (13)
where M=ln(imports from the world), P=ln(price of imports), D=ln(value
added-exports to the world), and e is a classical error term. Since the lagged
dependent variable is included, the assumption on the error term yields con-
sistent estimates. The import elasticities are measured as the estimated values
of a1. Elasticity estimates that were close to zero or positive were set equal to
the (negative) elasticity estimate of the closest 4-digit ISIC industry. This was
done for the five industries 3411 (set equal to 3419), 3551 (3559), 3822 (3823),
3825 (3823), 3843 (384), 3845 (3841). More details such as measures of fit on
the regressions is available from the authors.
This specification is based on an import demand function derived from in-
tertemporal optimization by Clarida (1996). Estimation of the model is done
using OLS. Senhadji’s study indicates that the estimates from OLS and the
Phillips-Hansen Fully Modified (FM) procedure yields similar results. (The FM
estimator is an optimal single-equation methods based on the use of OLS with
semiparametric corrections for serial correction and potential endogeneity of the
right-hand side variables.)
Denote the estimated values of a1 as E. Direct use of the unadjusted esti-
mates (E) will lead to erroneous results since it is a generated regressor. The
errors-in-variables correction on E (see Gawande (1997b)) based on the method
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of Fuller (1987) is used. This enables consistent estimation whenever import
elasticities are used as regressors, in linear or nonlinear models. The correction
is as follows. Ei is modeled as the observed value of the true (unobserved) own
price elasticity, ei, which is measured with error:
Ei = ei + ui, (14)
where ui is the measurement error in Ei with mean 0 and known variance , i.
This variance is equal to the square of the estimated standard errors reported
in Table A.1 A simple method to correct for the EIV problem [see e.g. Fuller’s
(1987, Ch. 3)] is to replace (each of the variables) ei in (12) by the prediction cEi
constructed as follows. Denote the sample variance of E by σ2E and the mean
of the measurement error variances by σ2u Let
cσ2e = σ2u − σ2E and E denote the
sample mean. Now construct the predictor
cEi = E :: + ::
cσ2e
cσ2e + σ
2
u,i
(Ei −E). (15)
Thus, whenever Ei has measurement error variance exactly equal to
cσ2E (an
estimate for the sample variance of ei, had we been able to measure it exactly)
it is presumed to be measured without error. Otherwise it is scaled down or
scaled up according to (15).
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 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Description Units Mean s.d. Min Max 
IATARIFF   
 
Argentina: Industry exceptions to zero tariffs: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.035
 
0.183
 
0
 
1 
IAPROH 
 
Argentina: Exceptions to zero Prohibitions: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.307
 
0.461
 
0
 
1 
IAAUTH 
 
Argentina: Exceptions to zero Authorizations: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.230
 
0.421
 
0
 
1 
IACORE 
 
Argentina: Exceptions to zero Core NTBs: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.338
 
0.473
 
0
 
1 
IBTARIFF   
 
Brazil: Industry exceptions to zero tariffs: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.003
 
0.052
 
0
 
1 
IBPROH 
 
Brazil: Exceptions to zero Prohibitions: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.057
 
0.232
 
0
 
1 
IBAUTH 
 
Brazil: Exceptions to zero Authorizations: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.122
 
0.327
 
0
 
1 
IBCORE 
 
Brazil: Exceptions to zero Core NTBs: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.110
 
0.313
 
0
 
1 
ITARIFF   
 
Both: Industry exceptions to zero tariffs: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.037
 
0.189
 
0
 
1 
IPROH 
 
Both: Exceptions to zero Prohibitions: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.364
 
0.481
 
0
 
1 
IAUTH 
 
Both: Exceptions to zero Authorizations: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.330
 
0.470
 
0
 
1 
ICORE 
 
Both: Exceptions to zero Core NTBs: 1=exceptioned, 0=free trade 
 
Binary 
 
0.420
 
0.494
 
0
 
1 
I
A,M 
 
Argentinian industries politically organized in Import sector (see Notes) 
 
Binary 
 
0.646
 
0.478
 
0
 
1 
IA,X  
 
Argentinian industries politically organized in Export sector (see Notes) 
 
Binary 
 
0.465
 
0.499
 
0
 
1 
IB,M  
 
Brazilian industries politically organized in Import sector (see Notes) 
 
Binary 
 
0.513
 
0.500
 
0
 
1 
IB,X 
 
Brazilian industries politically organized in Export sector (see Notes) 
 
Binary 
 
0.537
 
0.499
 
0
 
1 
(z/e)A,M 
 
Argentina: z=(VA/Imports from Brazil)*0.001, e=import elasticity(see Notes) 
 
- 
 
0.147
 
0.365
 
0.010
 
6.875 
(z/e)A,X 
 
Argentina: z=(VA/Exports to Brazil)*0.001, e=export elasticity (set equal to 1) 
 
- 
 
0.203
 
0.644
 
0.004
 
8.277 
(z/e)B,M 
 
Brazil: z=(VA/Imports from Argentina)*0.001, e=import elasticity (see Notes) 
 
- 
 
0.817
 
1.815
 
0.009
 
30.745 
(z/e)B,X 
 
Brazil: z=(VA/Exports to Argentina)*0.001, e=export elasticity (set equal to 1) 
 
- 
 
0.191
 
0.454
 
0.010
 
4.371 
(I×z/e)A,M 
 
I
A,M * (z/e)A,M 
 
- 
 
0.063
 
0.102
 
0
 
0.348 
(I×z/e)A,X 
 
IA,X *(z/e)A,X 
 
- 
 
0.038
 
0.098
 
0
 
1.007 
(I×z/e)B,M 
 
IB,M *(z/e)B,M 
 
- 
 
0.208
 
0.311
 
0
 
1.265 
(I×z/e)B,X 
 
IB,X * (z/e)B,X 
 
- 
 
0.076
 
0.325
 
0
 
4.371 
Notes: Sample size: 4490 HS 6-digit tariff line goods. The z/e variables and (I×z/e) variables are computed at the 4-digit ISIC (rev.2) level and then 
mapped into the 6-digit HS lines.  Value Added, Imports, and Exports data used to compute z are averages over 1994-1996. See appendix for details 
on  estimation and filtering of Import Elasticities.  IAM, IAX, IBM, IBX are defined using means of total (world) trade as threshold.  For example, IAMi=1 if 
total imports of Argentina in (ISIC 4-digit) industry i are greater than the (ISIC 4-digit) sample mean of total Argentinian imports.  
Internal Tariff and NTB indicators are for 1996, available directly at the HS 6-digit level.  NTBs are: PROH=soft prohibitions on imports, 
AUTH=prior imports authorization required, CORE=set of core NTBs including prohibitions, antidumping, and countervailing Duties.  
 Table 2: Marginal Effects from Probit Regression Models of the Exclusions Hypothesis 
 Dependent Variable: Indicators for Internal Deviations from Free Trade 
 
 
 
 
Tariff Exclusions 
 
NTB Exclusions 
 
 
 
TARIFFS 
 
PROHIBITIONS 
 
AUTHORIZATIONS 
 
CORE  NTBS 
 
 
 
All Org. 
 
I1 
 
All Org. 
 
I1 
 
All Org. 
 
I1 
 
All Org. 
 
I1 
 
(z/e) A,M   
(β1) 
 
0.011* 
(1.514) 
 
- 
 
0.006
(0.239)
 
-
 
-0.166**
(2.943)
 
- 
 
0.017
(0.562)
 
-
 
(I×z/e) A,M 
    
(β1) 
 
- 
 
 
0.056** 
(2.872) 
 
-
 
1.091**
(9.662)
 
-
 
-0.210 
(1.461) 
 
-
 
1.072**
(7.204)
 
(z/e)A,X   
(β2) 
 
0.020* 
(3.492) 
 
- 
 
0.020
(0.957)
 
-
 
0.046**
(2.228)
 
- 
 
0.002
(0.051)
 
-
 
(I×z/e)A,X  
(β2) 
 
- 
 
 
0.075** 
(6.360) 
 
-
 
-3.412**
(8.117)
 
-
 
-0.243** 
(2.531) 
 
-
 
-0.920**
(3.987)
 
(z/e)B,M   
(β3) 
 
-0.010* 
(3.231) 
 
- 
 
-0.00002
(0.001)
 
-
 
-0.017**
(2.035)
 
- 
 
0.001
(0.119)
 
-
 
(I×z/e)B,M 
  
(β3) 
 
- 
 
 
-0.025** 
(2.868) 
 
-
 
0.150**
(5.119)
 
-
 
0.274 
(9.904) 
 
-
 
0.120**
(3.616)
 
(z/e)B,X 
(β4) 
 
-0.019** 
(1.818) 
 
- 
 
-0.014
(0.637)
 
-
 
0.062
(2.226)
 
- 
 
0.002
(0.009)
 
-
 
(I×z/e)B,X 
(β4) 
 
- 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.156) 
 
-
 
0.044**
(1.962)
 
-
 
0.216** 
(5.704) 
 
-
 
0.200**
(4.320)
 
Dummies 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Importer 
Strength 
 
0.533** 
(2.921) 
 
2.554** 
(3.560) 
 
0.019
(0.241)
 
3.487**
(8.013)
 
-0.500**
(2.682)
 
-1.671** 
(3.298) 
 
0.042
(0.540)
 
2.567**
(6.212)
 
Exporter  
Strength 
 
1.003** 
(3.515) 
 
2.389** 
(5.898) 
 
0.103
(1.166)
 
-12.80**
(8.181)
 
-0.054
(0.559)
 
-1.581** 
(4.463) 
 
0.002
(0.029)
 
-3.023**
(4.723)
 
N 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
k 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
LR 
 
243.0** 
 
286.2** 
 
1990** 
 
2178** 
 
2019** 
 
2163** 
 
1956** 
 
2082** 
Notes: (1) Absolute t-values in parentheses. ** indicates statistical significance at 5% for the 1-tailed test.   
(2) Expected sign of coefficients below regressor name. Shaded cells indicate statistically significant coefficients at 
odds with theory.  (3) Regressions include eight 1-digit HS dummies plus a constant. These models are highly 
preferred over alternative models with just the constant instead of the dummies.  (4) All estimates are marginal 
effects (slopes) given by ∂E(y)/∂xi, where y is the binary dependent variable, and xi is a regressor.  This is identical 
to ∂Φ(xβ)/∂xi, where Φ is the standard normal cdf. (5) Importer strength is the Wald test for difference of 
coefficients: ωM=(I×z/e)AM - (I×z/e)BM.  If ωM > 0 then Argentinian importers have greater bargaining strength over 
Brazilian importers, and conversely.  Exporter strength is the Wald test for ωX=(I×z/e)AX - (I×z/e)BX.  If ωX < 0 then 
Argentinian exporters have greater bargaining strength over Brazilian exporters, and conversely.  
 Table 3: Robustness to Measures of Political Organization: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions 
 Dependent Variable: Indicators for Internal Deviations from Free Trade 
 
  
TARIFFS PROHIBITIONS AUTHORIZATIONS CORE NTBS 
 
 
I2 
 
I3 
 
I4 
 
I2 
 
I3 
 
I4 
 
I2 
 
I3 
 
I4 
 
I2 
 
I3 
 
I4 
 
(I×z/e)A,M 
  
(β1) 
 
0.302** 
(4.68) 
 
0.581** 
(1.731) 
 
-0.068
(0.759)
 
0.416
(1.200)
 
2.107**
(2.505)
 
-0.229
(0.880)
 
2.319** 
(7.555) 
 
3.112**
(3.760)
 
1.173**
(4.884)
 
1.638**
(4.294)
 
1.896**
(1.929)
 
0.001
(0.021)
 
(I×z/e)A,X  
(β2) 
 
0.042** 
(5.637) 
 
0.067** 
(6.183) 
 
0.074**
(6.251)
 
-2.216**
(4.783)
 
-1.336**
(2.345)
 
-2.517
(5.287)
 
-0.043 
(0.474) 
 
-0.079
(0.895)
 
-0.219**
(2.366)
 
-0.580**
(3.355)
 
-0.524**
(3.432)
 
-0.782**
(4.112)
 
(I×z/e)B,M 
  
(β3) 
 
-0.091** 
(3.147) 
 
-0.138** 
(1.880) 
 
-0.024**
(2.604)
 
0.132**
(6.463)
 
-0.007
(0.066)
 
0.024
(0.659)
 
0.448** 
(10.02) 
 
0.236**
(2.199)
 
0.085**
(2.775)
 
0.238**
(4.258)
 
-0.030
(0.238)
 
-0.004
(0.104)
 
(I×z/e)B,X 
(β4) 
 
0.019** 
(2.512) 
 
0.025** 
2.235 
 
-0.013
(1.227)
 
0.034
(0.377)
 
-.276**
(2.295)
 
0.025
(1.069)
 
0.154** 
(1.659) 
 
0.254**
(2.792)
 
0.179**
(4.782)
 
0.090
(0.852)
 
-0.130
(1.122)
 
0.164**
(3.646)
 
Dummies 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Importer 
Strength 
 
0.393** 
(4.586) 
 
0.719* 
(1.781) 
 
-0.044
(0.475)
 
0.104
(0.288)
 
2.114**
(2.284)
 
-0.253
(0.946)
 
1.871** 
(5.925) 
 
2.876**
(3.132)
 
1.092**
(4.461)
 
1.400**
(3.521)
 
1.926*
(1.773)
 
-0.005
(0.034)
 
Exporter  
Strength 
 
0.023** 
(2.110) 
 
0.042** 
(2.608) 
 
0.087**
(5.297)
 
-2.182**
(4.582)
 
-1.060*
(1.777)
 
-2.542**
(5.328)
 
-0.197 
(1.527) 
 
-0.333**
(2.635)
 
-0.398**
(3.980)
 
-0.670**
(3.206)
 
-0.394**
(2.036)
 
-0.946**
(4.817)
 
N 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
4490 
 
k 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
LR 
 
290.8** 
 
273.1** 
 
279.4** 
 
2089** 
 
2038** 
 
2043 
 
2207** 
 
2114** 
 
2073** 
 
2027** 
 
1984** 
 
2003* 
 
DM 
 
-0.103 
 
-0.027 
 
0.036 
 
0.0004 
 
0 
 
-4.418 
 
-2.910** 
 
-3.093**
 
-3.534**
 
-3.974**
 
-4.297**
 
-0.751**
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses. ** indicates statistical significance at 5% and * at 10%.  Also see Notes (2)-(5) to Table 2. 
(1)  Models are differentiated by how the political political organization variables IJk, J=A,B and k=M,X are constructed.  They are as follows: 
Model I1 (reported in Table 1): IJki=1 of total imports (exports) of industry i in country J are above the mean of the ISIC sample.   
Model I2: IJki=1 of total imports (exports) of industry i in country J are above the 85th percentile of the ISIC sample.   
Model I3: IJki=1 of total imports (exports) of industry i in country J are above the 90th percentile of the ISIC sample.   
Model I4: IJki=1 of total imports (exports) of industry i in country J are above the mean of the ISIC sample and output per firm is above the 25th percentile. 
(2) DM is the Davidson-MacKinnon (1993) non-nested test-statistic for the probit model.  It compares the models here with the corresponding models in 
Table 2.  The statistical significance of DM indicates the models here are preferred. 
